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EVAN CAMINKER

LOCATION TRACKING AND DIGITAL
DATA: CAN CARPENTER BUILD
A STABLE PRIVACY DOCTRINE?

In Carpenter v United States,1 the Supreme Court struggled to modernize twentieth-century search and seizure precedents for the
“Cyber Age.”2 Twice previously this decade the Court had tweaked
Fourth Amendment doctrine to keep pace with advancing technology, requiring a search warrant before the government can either
peruse the contents of a cell phone seized incident to arrest3 or use a
GPS tracker to follow a car’s long-term movements.4 This time, the

Evan Caminker is the Branch Rickey Collegiate Professor of Law and former Dean,
University of Michigan Law School.
Author’s note: I briefed and argued Carpenter on behalf of the United States before the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals while I was on academic leave and serving as a Special Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Michigan. Once the Supreme Court
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This article does not discuss, reﬂect, or reveal any inside information about the litigation. All
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or even speculation of the United States. I thank Vik Amar, Eve Brensike Primus, Don Herzog,
Jerry Israel, David Moran, Deeva Shah, and Geof Stone for valuable input on earlier drafts, and
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138 S Ct 2206 (2018).
Id at 2224 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

3

Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2014).

4

United States v Jones, 565 US 400 (2012) (twenty-eight-day tracking).
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Court asked what the Fourth Amendment requires when law enforcement seeks cell phone records revealing the user’s approximate
location when his cell phone connects to local cell towers. The
Court’s answer “is a familiar one—get a warrant.”5
Familiar, yes; but easy, no: the Court split 5–4 with four separate
dissenting opinions spanning 115 pages. The case reﬂects a fundamental clash between long-standing doctrinal approaches and new
surveillance and digital information technologies. The government
today has unprecedentedly sophisticated ways of seeing, hearing, and
tracking people, ways that were unimaginable to the Fourth Amendment’s Framers. The question is whether and how the Court should
adjust constitutional doctrines to maintain some historical or reasonable equilibrium between privacy and law enforcement, or whether
legislatures should be the guardians of privacy in the face of technological innovation.
The Court addressed this question in Carpenter at a time when its
existing doctrinal approaches are both stressed and uncertain. The
Court’s primary framework protects individuals from unwarranted
invasions of their “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a doctrine ﬁrst
announced ﬁfty-plus years ago in Katz v United States,6 and then
reﬁned a decade later in United States v Miller7 and Smith v Maryland 8
through the third-party doctrine that withheld protection for information voluntarily disclosed to others. Both of these doctrines have
come under withering attack from different quarters: Katz for protecting privacy too freely, Miller-Smith for withdrawing that protection too rigidly, and both for being textually and conceptually
ungrounded. Perhaps in response to these criticisms, some Justices
recently revived an older framework, most famously articulated in
Olmstead v United States,9 holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
people only against physical intrusions on or in “material things―the

5

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221.

6

389 US 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J, concurring) (requiring warrant to eavesdrop
electronically on phone conversations).
7
425 US 435 (1976) (holding customer lacks Fourth Amendment interest in bank’s records
showing his ﬁnancial transactions).
8
442 US 735 (1979) (holding phone customer lacks Fourth Amendment interest in phone
company’s records showing whom he called).
9
277 US 438 (1928) (rejecting challenge to government wiretapping of phone conversations).
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person, the house, his papers, or his effects.”10 This test too has raised
questions of scope and principled application.11
Lurking in the background, moreover, are competing motivations
for Fourth Amendment doctrine: to protect atomistic privacy and
security interests of individual citizens, and to regulate government
conduct that might threaten such values.12 The atomistic approach
suffuses through the doctrine today, for example, by limiting Fourth
Amendment standing to people whose rights were arguably violated
by, rather than who were just incriminated by, a questionable search.13
But the regulatory approach has its own foothold, most notably in the
exclusionary remedy designed generally to deter illegal searching
rather than to vindicate individual rights14—and some claim anew
that a regulatory approach is required to address privacy threats of the
modern age.15
What makes the Carpenter decision a potential game changer is that
neither the Katz nor Olmstead doctrines, whether viewed through an
atomistic or regulatory lens, previously seemed hospitable to many
novel Fourth Amendment claims arising in the digital age. Today,
given widespread use of the internet, the cloud, corporate digital-data
storage, internet-connected personal devices, and related technologies, a huge amount of personal and sensitive information is stored
somewhere in the digital records of an institutional third party, be it a
phone company, internet service provider, bank, credit-card company, social media giant, phone applications manager, online retailer,
wearable technology company, or medical provider.16 And govern10

Id at 464.

11

See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 Supreme Court
Review 67, 90–93 (exploring ambiguities).
12
See, for example, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn L
Rev 349, 367 (1974) (“Does [the Amendment] safeguard my person and your house and her
papers and his effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; or is it essentially a regulatory
canon requiring government to order its law enforcement procedures in a fashion that keeps us
collectively secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures?”).
13

Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 133–38 (1978).
Both the deterrence focus of the exclusionary rule, and its burgeoning exception for
good-faith violations, reﬂect this approach. See Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236–39
(2011).
15
See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 BC L Rev 1511
(2010); Donald A. Dripps, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment Forty Years Later: Toward the
Realization of an Inclusive Regulatory Model, 100 Minn L Rev 1885 (2016).
14

16
“Use of the Internet is vital for a wide range of routine activities in today’s world—
ﬁnding and applying for work, obtaining government services, engaging in commerce,
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ment ofﬁcials regularly subpoena documents containing this information, without warrants or probable cause, in early-stage crime
investigations. Prior to this decision, Katz’s reasonable expectations–
based approach, as limited by the third-party doctrine, did not protect the privacy interests of the targets of such investigations because
the targets had voluntarily shared their information with the third
party, thus relinquishing any erstwhile claim to privacy. And the
older/revised Olmstead property invasion–based approach did not
protect the targets’ privacy interests because the records being secured weren’t “their . . . papers [or] effects” but belonged to the third
party.
In his majority opinion in Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts redirected the Katz route to require the government to obtain search
warrants before securing location-revealing cell phone records, by
broadening the scope of privacy interests and narrowing the exception carved out by the third-party doctrine. The issues are complicated and the opinions long. My goal here is to analyze carefully the
Court’s approach, to explain and critically evaluate its reasoning, to
highlight remaining important questions, and to project future directions.
Like Justice Gorsuch in dissent, “I do not begin to claim all the
answers today.”17 But my main conclusions are these: To ﬁnd a
Fourth Amendment search, the Court substantially refashioned
(though it claimed otherwise) Katz’s progeny to replace relatively
deﬁnitive-though-controversial rules with multivariate standards,
primarily by emphasizing the comparative sensitivity of location information; this shift makes doctrine more ﬂexible and hospitable to
digital privacy claims but also less coherent and clear. And at key
points the Court’s reasoning appears to reﬂect a regulatory as well as
atomistic attitude toward privacy protection, motivated to forestall an
Orwellian future of rampant surveillance of everyone’s movements
and activities. The Court purported to move cautiously, crafting a
self-described “narrow” opinion addressing cell phone location records and little else, persistently labeling cell phone tracking “novel”
and “unique” and creating a “qualitatively different category” of

communicating with friends and family, and gathering information on just about anything, to
take but a few examples.” United States v LaCoste, 821 F3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir 2016).
17

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2268 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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sensitive records.18 But the opinion’s reasoning opens the door for
lower courts and future Court decisions to protect privacy well beyond this category.
As for the required justiﬁcation, “get a warrant” is the familiar
route for full-scale searches. But it is also a novel approach to requests
for private document production, and the Court’s ruling raises interesting and either underappreciated or unanticipated questions
about broader categories of subpoenas as well. The more broadly the
warrant requirement applies, the more it will frustrate “many legitimate and valuable investigative practices upon which law enforcement has rightfully come to rely.”19 So even if the Court’s Katzexpanding reasoning invites further privacy protection over time, I
predict that at some point the warrant’s constraint on law enforcement efforts will likely curb that momentum. Carpenter takes a strong
ﬁrst step toward digital privacy protection, but the length of the stride
remains unclear.
Part I sets the stage by brieﬂy sketching the litigation, existing
doctrinal approaches, and the ﬁve separate opinions in the case. Part II
examines the Court’s conclusion that acquiring customers’ cell phone
records from their service provider constitutes a Fourth Amendment
“search” because it violates their reasonable expectation of privacy.
Part III examines the Court’s conclusion that such searches require a
probable cause–backed warrant rather than the lesser showing typically required for document subpoenas, and it considers the majority
opinion’s potential effect on ﬁrst-party subpoenas as well. In my view,
the Court’s path to both conclusions is bumpy at best, though perhaps
understandably so as the Court heads in a new direction across fastchanging technological terrain.20
If nothing else, Carpenter means that a majority of the Justices are
searching to ﬁnd ways to better protect privacy in the modern age. And
by retooling long-standing precedent to be more adaptive to privacy
concerns, the decision invites much more open and free-spirited dia-

18
19

Id at 2216–17 (majority).

Id at 2247 (Alito, J, dissenting).
Amsterdam, 58 Minn L Rev at 352 (cited in note 12) (the Court sometimes decides
cases based on a new approach “even though it is not prepared to announce the new principle
in terms of comparable generality with the old, still less to say how much the old must be
displaced and whether or how the old and new can be accommodated.”).
20
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logue among lower courts, as they confront what Justice Alito aptly
anticipates will be a continuing “blizzard of litigation.”21 We’ll ﬁnd out
soon enough whether the decision works a shift in constitutional
doctrine that is as “seismic” as the shift in the technology it’s chasing.22
I. Carpenter’s Backdrop and Decision
a. cell-phone tracking a cell phone thief
You really couldn’t make up better facts: Timothy Carpenter used
his cell phone to help his confederates steal cell phones, and then the
government used his cell phone records to help to put him in a prison
cell.23
In April 2011, police arrested four men suspected of joining a
larger, rotating crew committing a months-long string of armed
robberies during which they stole brand new cell phones from Radio
Shack and T-Mobile stores in Michigan and Ohio. One arrestee
confessed and squealed on half-brothers “Little Tim” Carpenter and
“Big Tim” Sanders, plus others, providing the FBI with many of the
group’s cell phone numbers.
Federal ofﬁcials applied under the Stored Communications Act24
(SCA) for a court order to obtain Carpenter’s and his accomplices’
cell phone records for the months covering the crime spree. Specifically, the ofﬁcials wanted call detail records indicating the phone
numbers the men called at what times, and also records indicating
which cell phone towers the phones used when the men made or
received those calls—otherwise known as cell-site location information, or CSLI.
Cell phones transmit radio signals to cell sites (antennas) mounted
on cell towers. Each tower typically has three or six cell sites spread
around it in a circle, creating separate sectors that carve the space
surrounding the tower into pie-slice-shaped service areas. More
sectors create narrower pie slices, and closer towers create shorter
slices. When the phone sends or receives a call, text message, or other

21
22

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2247 (Alito, J, dissenting).
Id at 2219 (majority).

23
See generally id at 2211–13; Carpenter v United States, 819 F3d 880, 884–85 (6th Cir
2016).
24

18 USC §§ 2701–12 (2012).
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data, the phone signals the local cell site with the strongest signal.25
That’s usually the nearest tower, so the phone typically connects to
the cell site located at the tip of the service area in which the phone
resides.26 Wireless carriers can detect and record which phones
connect to which of their cell sites at what times. For various business
reasons, such as detecting coverage problems and billing for roaming charges, they maintain records containing their customers’ CSLI
for up to several years.
The SCA authorizes judges to compel production of cell phone
records when government provides “speciﬁc and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” the records
sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”27—a signiﬁcantly weaker showing than the probable cause typically required for a search warrant, though more than required for
a grand jury subpoena. Agents requested 152 days of CSLI records
from Carpenter’s primary carrier MetroPCS (which produced 127),
and seven days of records from roaming-in-Ohio carrier Sprint
(which produced two, all it had). The records indicated that Carpenter
placed cell phone calls from within a half-mile to two miles from
several of the robberies just before or while they occurred, corroborating reports that Carpenter was typically the “lookout” who used
his phone to signal the actual robbers when to enter the targeted
stores.
Combining this location information with other evidence, the
United States charged Carpenter with six counts of robbery, Sanders
with two counts, and both with related gun offenses. Both defendants
moved to suppress Sprint’s CSLI data,28 arguing that its procurement
without a probable cause–backed search warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and at trial the
government introduced a few of the CSLI records to locate the
25
Unless turned off or in “airplane mode,” the phone continually sends out registration
pings to nearby cell sites, measuring in advance the relative strength of available connections
so it is ready to go. Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular
Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, Richmond J L & Tech 1, 5 (2011).
26
Weather, topography, and obstructions such as buildings and trees can sometimes cause
cell phones to connect to a tower that isn’t the nearest one. Id at 6–7.
27

18 USC § 2703(d).
Following the Court’s lead, Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219 (referencing “Sprint Corporation and its competitors”), I’ll use Sprint to refer to the carriers (including MetroPCS) involved in this case and also generic wireless carriers.
The defendants did not seek to suppress the call detail records linked to the cell-site data.
28
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defendants near some of the robberies when they occurred. A jury
found both men guilty, and the court sentenced Carpenter to over
116 years’ imprisonment (note: if you rob a store, don’t let a buddy
use a gun).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit afﬁrmed, holding that
compelling Sprint to produce CSLI records does not constitute a
Fourth Amendment search.29 This ruling was predictably consistent
with other Court of Appeals rulings, because then-binding Supreme
Court precedent was fairly clear.30 But there were equally clear signs
of a storm brewing within the Court over the direction of doctrine
and its suitability for the digital age. And when the Court granted
review despite the lack of a circuit split, one could easily forecast a
tempest ahead.31
b. competing fourth amendment frameworks
The Fourth Amendment declares “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. . . .”32 The Court
over time, and internally today, has split between two quite different
doctrinal frameworks and motivating visions.

29

Carpenter, 819 F3d at 886–90.

30

In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Comm’n
Service to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F3d 304 (3d Cir 2010); In re Application of United States
for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F3d 600 (5th Cir 2013); United States v Davis, 785 F3d 498
(11th Cir 2015) (en banc); United States v Graham, 824 F3d 421 (4th Cir 2016) (en banc);
United States v Thompson, 866 F3d 1149 (10th Cir 2017).
31
Sanders did not petition for certiorari alongside Carpenter, despite his own fourteenyear sentence. Of course, even a Supreme Court victory would not likely help the halfbrothers’ plight. Upon remand, Carpenter will (and Sanders would have) likely confront the
argument that his CSLI records were still admissible at trial based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as the government reasonably followed the SCA’s procedures. See Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 349 (1987) (good-faith exception applies when ofﬁcials
act “in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute” unless it is “clearly unconstitutional”);
United States v Warshak, 631 F3d 266, 288–89 (6th Cir 2010) (applying good-faith exception
to e-mail content records secured under the SCA despite ruling that procuring e-mail content
requires a warrant); United States v Pembrook, 876 F3d 812, 823 (6th Cir 2017) (applying
exception to CSLI records based on alternative argument that no binding judicial precedent
then required a warrant). Carpenter will also likely face strong arguments, as Sanders would
have too, that the CSLI evidence was cumulative so any error was harmless. See Brief for the
United States, United States v Carpenter, Nos 15-1572 & 14-1805, ∗40–47 (6th Cir, ﬁled
May 6, 2015) archived at https://perma.cc/78RV-KT83 (Carpenter 6th Cir Brief ) (advancing
good-faith exception and harmless error arguments).
32

US Const, Amend IV.
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1. The Katz framework: privacy and public exposure. In Katz, FBI
agents eavesdropped on the defendant’s phone call by placing an
electronic listening device on the outside of a public telephone booth.
Because the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”33 the
Court announced, it didn’t matter that the government had left untouched Katz’s person, houses, papers, or effects. As Justice Harlan
famously restated the rule in his concurring opinion, a person enjoys
a Fourth Amendment protected interest if she has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and . . . the expectation [is] one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”34 By shutting
the phone-booth door behind him, Katz reasonably expected his
conversation would remain private except for the person he was
calling.35 The Court has embraced and applied Justice Harlan’s twopart “reasonable expectation of privacy” test ever since.36
But from the very beginning, the Court made clear that public
disclosure defeats potential Fourth Amendment protection. As Katz
put it, the Fourth Amendment does not protect “objects, activities, or
statements that [a person] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders.”37
This principle manifests itself in several ways, two of which are
central here:
Exposure of public movements: Revealing yourself to the general
public extinguishes any erstwhile privacy interest in your location or
visible activities. In United States v Knotts,38 police used a “beeper”
planted in a container of chloroform, after visual surveillance failed,
to help track a vehicle used by suspected drug manufacturers. The
Court held that the tracking did not constitute a search, reasoning
that Knotts could not reasonably expect privacy “in his movements
from one place to another” because “he voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look” his route, stops along the way, and ﬁnal
destination.39 The Court has since invoked this reasoning to deny

33

389 US at 351.

34

Id at 361 (Harlan, J, concurring).
Id.

35
36

See, for example, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 9 (1968); Smith, 442 US at 740.

37

Katz, 389 US at 361 (Harlan, J, concurring); see id at 351 (majority) (“What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or ofﬁce, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
38

460 US 276 (1983).

39

Knotts, 460 US at 281–82.
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privacy protection for movement and activities in a variety of contexts
where “anyone who wants to look” can see what’s going on.40
And yet Knotts cryptically hinted at a possible limit to what “anyone”
can see, as different rules might apply to “dragnet type” twenty-fourhour surveillance practices.41 Three decades later in United States v
Jones,42 ﬁve Justices turned the hint into a full-blown alarm. Suspecting
Jones of drug trafﬁcking, agents surreptitiously attached a GPS
tracking device to his car and remotely monitored the car’s movements
for twenty-eight days.43 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion,
holding that physically afﬁxing the device to the car constituted a
Fourth Amendment search under Olmstead’s invasion-of-property
approach.44 But Justice Sotomayor (for herself, after joining the majority) and Justice Alito (for himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan, rejecting the majority) penned Katz-driven concurring opinions, recognizing that modern technologies enable police to track a car
without physically intruding upon it.45 After focusing on ways that
GPS location information can reveal sensitive information, they posited that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”46
This shadow majority of ﬁve Justices embraced what many call a
“mosaic” theory: even though discrete movements or locations lack
Fourth Amendment protection after being “disclosed to the public at
large,”47 a substantial aggregation of those movements can rise to the
level of a protected interest. While privacy advocates cheered this
nonprecedential endorsement,48 critics viewed the mosaic approach
40
See, for example, California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 213–15 (1986) (no search where police
in private plane ﬂew over defendant’s yard and spotted marijuana, because defendant voluntarily exposed backyard to visual observation from publicly navigable airspace); Florida v
Riley, 488 US 445, 449 (1989) (same for helicopter ﬂyover).
41

Knotts, 460 US at 283–84.

42

565 US 400 (2012).
Agents exceeded their search warrant authority by attaching the device too late and in
the wrong jurisdiction. 565 US at 402–3.
43

44
45
46
47

Id at 404. See text accompanying notes 61–63.
Id at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
Id at 430 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment); id at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2215.
See, for example, Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 Duke J Const’l L & Pub Pol
(Special Issue) 1 (2012); Paul Rosenzweig, In Defense of the Mosaic Theory (LawFare, Nov 29,
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/RYX5-DUVS.
48
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as “upend[ing] decades of settled doctrine”49 and raising signiﬁcant
conceptual and pragmatic questions.50 Thus the Jones concurrences
created substantial uncertainty about Knotts’s heretofore bright-line
public exposure doctrine.
Exposure of third-party records: The Fourth Amendment likewise
does not protect information that is willingly disclosed to a third
party and then obtained by the government from that party. In United
States v Miller, federal agents who suspected Miller of running an
illegal whiskey distillery subpoenaed his banks to produce his ﬁnancial
records, including some checks, deposit slips, and other account documentation. The Court rejected Miller’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the subpoenas, holding that he lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in the banks’ records and therefore he was not
“searched” under Katz.51 He had “voluntarily conveyed” the soughtafter information to the banks and “exposed [it] to their employees in
the ordinary course of business.”52 Miller thus took the risk that the
banks would share that information with the government.
Three years later in Smith v Maryland the police, suspecting Smith
of making badgering phone calls to a woman he had robbed, asked a
telephone company to install at its central ofﬁce a pen register corresponding to Smith’s home landline.53 The pen register recorded only
the outgoing phone numbers he dialed, not the content of any communications.54 The Court rejected Smith’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the warrantless request because Smith voluntarily revealed the
called numbers to the phone company through his dialing. Smith
lacked a subjective expectation of privacy, knowing he had to convey
the numbers to complete his calls, and knowing the company could
make and keep records of his calls.55 And, in any event, any subjective
expectation of privacy would not be objectively reasonable, as “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he

49
Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 Supreme Court Review 205, 209.
50
See, for example, Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich L
Rev 311 (2012) (explaining and largely criticizing the mosaic approach).
51

Miller, 425 US at 437–40.

52

Id at 442.
Smith, 442 US at 737.

53
54

Id at 741.

55

Id at 742–43.
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voluntarily turns over to third parties.”56 So again, the pen register’s
use was not a search under Katz.
The seminal Miller-Smith decisions established the third-party
doctrine that cabins Katz. As Miller summarized:
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the conﬁdence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.57

Scholars haven’t been kind to this doctrine, to say the least,
claiming that the doctrine’s all-or-nothing treatment of disclosure
clashes with any reasonable conception of reasonable expectations.58
For some critics, Miller and Smith were wrong when decided; for
others, their legacy became increasingly untenable as third parties’
digital creation and retention of personal records burgeoned over
time. As currently applied to a world in which countless companies
digitally store vast amounts of personal information about virtually
everyone―including but not limited to records of communications,
purchases, ﬁnances, computer searches, car operations, media viewing, home and wearable technology use, travel, and medical histories59―the doctrine forestalls Fourth Amendment protection and
gives government access basically for the asking. After Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones echoed this chorus of criticism by
proclaiming “it may be necessary to reconsider” the third-party
doctrine because the “approach is ill suited to the digital age,”60 the
Miller-Smith ediﬁce suddenly wobbled.
2. The Olmstead framework: property-focused tetrad intrusions.
Along with questions about Katz’s “public exposure” principles came
questions about Katz itself. Because the reasonable expectations of
privacy test isn’t constrained by the textual tetrad of persons, houses,
papers, or effects, Justices inclined toward textual or originalist interpretation predictably looked elsewhere for guidance.
56
57
58

Id at 743–44.
Miller, 425 US at 443.
See note 170.

59

See, for example, Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 Okla L Rev 699, 704–7 (2014); id at 704 (“If we
step back and think of our everyday experiences, it is easy to see that very signiﬁcant information about each of us is recorded by third parties that used to be recorded by no one.”).
60

565 US at 417 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
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In Jones, Justice Scalia resurrected Olmstead’s property-based approach. In Olmstead, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to government wiretapping of home and ofﬁce phone lines
used by bootlegging suspects. The Court held that the “amendment
itself shows that the search is to be of material things—the person, the
house, his papers, or his effects”61 rather than intangible things such
as sounds or sights. In addition, the Court continued, a search occurs
only upon “an actual physical invasion” of such material things.62
Because the agents tapped Olmstead’s phone lines “without any
trespass upon [his] property,”63 they conducted no Fourth Amendment search. In Jones, Justice Scalia (with four other Justices) applied
this test in holding that when agents attached a GPS tracking device
to Jones’s car, they “physically occup[ied] private property for the
purpose of obtaining information” and therefore searched the car.64
Justice Scalia posited that this tetrad-invasion approach, in which
the Fourth Amendment primarily protects property rather than privacy interests, could coexist with Katz.65 But there is no question that
he and other like-minded Justices (presumably including his successor Justice Gorsuch) hoped never to rely on Katz going forward,
adding additional uncertainty to the mix.66 Thus, the ﬁssures within
Katz and its progeny and the resurgence of the property-based approach raised questions about whether and how Carpenter might
build new doctrine for the digital age.
c. overview of carpenter’s opinions
1. The Court (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan). Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for
the Court applied the Katz framework, concluding that when the
government acquired Carpenter’s cell-site records, it “searched” him
61
62

Olmstead, 277 US at 464.
Id at 466.

63

Id at 457.

64

565 US at 404.
Id at 409.

65

66
As recounted earlier, in Jones four Justices embraced the property-based framework, four
the reasonable-expectations framework, and one both. In Florida v Jardines, 569 US 1 (2013),
ﬁve Justices held that police searched Jardines’s home when they lingered at his front door
with a drug-snifﬁng dog because they thereby physically invaded the house’s curtilage
without license to do so, three of these Justices held that the lingering was also a search
because it invaded Jardines’s Katz-based reasonable expectation of privacy, and the other four
Justices held none of the above.
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by invading his reasonable expectation of privacy in information
about his whereabouts. The Court invoked some “basic guideposts”
for Katz’s application: the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure the
“‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’” and “‘to place obstacles in
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’ ” 67 When confronting
“innovations in surveillance tools,” Roberts explained, the Court seeks
to “‘assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against Government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’ ”68
Following these guideposts, the Court decided that Carpenter had
a protected privacy interest in CSLI data revealing his movements
over a week or more, but left open the question for shorter durations.69 Roberts explained that location information is sufﬁciently
continuous and precise that the records essentially tracked Carpenter
back in time to provide an “all-encompassing record of [his] whereabouts”70—sufﬁcient to potentially reveal “not only his particular
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.’”71 Such long-term tracking, Roberts
noted, goes beyond what people normally expect to expose publicly as
they move around. Embracing the mosaic theory, the Court cabined
Knotts and recognized Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy
“in the whole of his physical movements.”72
The Court then held, for the ﬁrst time, that the Miller-Smith thirdparty doctrine did not encompass a particular category of stored
records. First, given the widespread use of and need for cell phones
today, Roberts maintained that CSLI is not voluntarily shared in the
same way as bank records and phone calls. Second, he argued, location records are more sensitive than bank and call records. “There is a
world of difference,” he explained, “between the limited types of
personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless
carriers today.”73 Thus, “[i]n light of the deeply revealing nature of
67
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214, quoting Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 630 (1886), and
United States v Di Re, 332 US 581, 595 (1948), respectively.
68
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214, quoting Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 34 (2001).
69

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217 n 3.

70

Id at 2217.
Id, quoting Jones, 565 US at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).

71
72

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.

73

Id.
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CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”74 As a result, Carpenter’s
location information “was the product of a search.”75
Absent exigent circumstances, the Court further held, such a
search requires a warrant backed by probable cause.76 The Court
dismissed the suggestion that because the SCA requires Sprint or
other carriers to produce the CSLI records itself, the lesser Fourth
Amendment standard of relevance and nonburdensomeness typically
required for subpoenas duces tecum (and satisﬁed by SCA orders)
should apply. The Court concluded this lesser standard is not appropriate where the target retains a Katz-based privacy interest in the
records being sought, a “rare case” justifying the stricter warrant
requirement.77
2. Justice Kennedy’s dissent ( joined by Justices Thomas and Alito).
Justice Kennedy wrote the primary (and his very last) dissent. The
main thrust of his argument was that the Court applied Katz too expansively and the “public exposure” precedents too narrowly. Justice
Kennedy defended the Miller-Smith third-party doctrine, arguing ﬁrst
that it faithfully reﬂects the notion that people cannot claim a privacy
interest in papers or effects that are not theirs, and second that the
doctrine accords with the government’s traditional authority to use
(warrantless) subpoenas to obtain documents.78 Carpenter, Justice
Kennedy argued, loses under this doctrine because he does not own,
possess, or control Sprint’s CSLI records in any meaningful sense.79
The Court ﬁnds otherwise, Justice Kennedy continued, only by
misreading its “public exposure” precedents. While he questioned
the Court’s use of the Jones concurrences to supersede Knotts’s privacy waiver for public movements,80 he trained his ﬁre on the Court’s
“transform[ing] Miller and Smith into an unprincipled and unwork74

Id at 2223.

75

Id at 2217.
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221. The SCA’s statutory standard fell “well short” of the required showing. Id.
76

77
78

Id at 2221–22.
Id at 2227–29 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

79

Id at 2229–30 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

80

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2231 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
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able doctrine.”81 In his view, Miller-Smith established a bright-line
rule extinguishing privacy interests in shared information, rather
than a balancing test taking sensitivity into account.82 And even so, he
maintained, the Court erred in its arbitrary judgments that location
information is more sensitive than ﬁnancial and phone call records,
that location records are cheaper and easier to acquire, and that cell
phone use is less “voluntary” than using banks or credit cards.83
Because technological change has “complex effects on crime and
law enforcement” and can inﬂuence both property norms and expectations of privacy, Justice Kennedy would defer to Congress’ judgment in enacting the SCA, which he believed “weighed the privacy
interests at stake and imposed a judicial check to prevent executive
overreach.”84 Kennedy closed by worrying that the Court’s decision
would negatively affect law enforcement, noting that access to CSLI
is “an important investigative tool for solving serious crimes” and
is often “indispensable” in the early stages of an investigation before
the government can develop probable cause supporting a warrant.85
3. Justice Thomas’s dissent. Justice Thomas also maintained that
the key issue is not “whether” a search occurred (yes), but “whose”
property was searched.86 Although Sprint was “searched,” Thomas
insisted that Carpenter was not “searched” because neither property,
tort, contract, nor federal statutory law supports Carpenter’s claim
that Sprint’s records are his papers or effects.87
But Justice Thomas wrote separately primarily to lambast Katz,
which “has no basis in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment”
and “invites courts to make judgments about policy, not law.”88 First,
he argued, the reasonable expectation of privacy test has no plausible
foundation in Fourth Amendment text because it distorts the original
meaning of “search,” wrongly focuses on privacy rather than property, reads the tetrad list out of the text, excises the word “their”

81

Id at 2230 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

82

Id at 2232 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
Id at 2232–33 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

83
84

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2233 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).

85

Id at 2233–34 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
Id at 2235 (Thomas, J, dissenting).

86
87

Id at 2242–43 (Thomas, J, dissenting).

88

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2236 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
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modifying the tetrad, and wrongly applies “unreasonable” to deﬁne
searches rather than to justify them.89 Second, he argued, the Katz test
has proven unworkable in practice, which he illustrated by stringing
together a long list of scholarly epithets, including my favorite, “a
mass of contradictions and obscurities.”90 It is not clear, he observed,
whether privacy expectations are to be measured empirically or normatively, and (even worse) neither measure is any good.91 The nicest
thing Justice Thomas called Katz is a “failed experiment,” one that
the Court, he maintained, is duty-bound to reconsider.92 If that happens, it’s not hard to guess what Justice Thomas will do.
4. Justice Alito’s dissent ( joined by Justice Thomas). Justice Alito
piled on by also attacking the Court’s decision to let Carpenter object
to the search of a third party’s property, arguing that neither the
constitutional text nor a proper reading of Miller-Smith permits this,
and insisting that neither federal statute nor any other law gives
Carpenter “any meaningful property-based connection to the cellsite records owned by his provider.”93
Justice Alito’s primary target, however, was the Court’s decision to
require a warrant for the “search” it deﬁned. To Alito, the Court
ignored the basic distinction between a traditional search in which
government agents rummage through protected spaces or things, and
a constructive search in which government agents simply request the
target to produce speciﬁed documents. Alito traced the history of
subpoenas from British practice through the founding,94 concluding
that “the Fourth Amendment, as originally understood, did not apply
to the compulsory production of documents at all.”95 He acknowledged that the Court’s doctrine does not reﬂect this view; instead,
document subpoenas must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement96—but they do so when they satisfy the
much-relaxed standard of being limited in scope, relevant in purpose,

89

Id at 2238, 2239–40, 2241, 2241–42, 2243–44 (Thomas, J, dissenting).

90

Id at 2244 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
Id at 2245–46 (Thomas, J, dissenting).

91
92

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2246 (Thomas, J, dissenting).

93

Id at 2257–60, 2260 (Alito, J, dissenting).
Id at 2247–52 (Alito, J, dissenting).

94
95

Id at 2250 (Alito, J, dissenting).

96

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2252–57 (Alito, J, dissenting).
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and not unreasonably burdensome.97 SCA orders easily pass this
test.98
After lamenting the Court’s failure to defer to legislative judgments regarding privacy and technology, Justice Alito concluded that
“[t]he desire to make a statement about privacy in the digital age does
not justify the consequences [of thwarting important law enforcement investigations] that today’s decision is likely to produce.”99
5. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent—or concurrence dressed as a dissent.
Justice Gorsuch also jumped on the Katz-bashing bandwagon. He
maintained that both the Fourth Amendment’s “plain terms” and
history show that the “framers chose not to protect privacy in some
ethereal way” but only in “particular places and things,” meaning the
textual tetrad.100 He also characterized the Katz test as both undetermined and indeterminate: after ﬁve decades of doctrinal dominance
“we still don’t even know” whether the test poses an empirical or a
normative question,101 and insufﬁciently guided judges have reached
decisions that are “often unpredictable—and sometimes unbelievable,”102 inevitably resting on their “own curious judgment.”103 Moreover, he declared, the Miller-Smith gloss is “not only wrong, but
horribly wrong,”104 whether the question about post-sharing expectations is empirical or normative, which itself is unclear.105 And beyond
that, he insisted, the Court’s effort to tweak and apply Katz and MillerSmith to the facts in Carpenter made matters worse, now dictating two
“amorphous balancing tests”—“Katz-squared”106—weighing incom-

97

Id at 2256 (Alito, J, dissenting).

98

Id at 2255 (Alito, J, dissenting).
Id at 2261 (Alito, J, dissenting).

99

100

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2264 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).

101

Id at 2265 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
Id at 2266 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting), poking fun in particular at Florida v Riley’s approval
of police snooping around residential backyards via hovering helicopter, 488 US 455 (1989),
and California v Greenwood’s approval of police rummaging through curbed trash ahead of the
raccoons, 486 US 35 (1988).
103
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2266 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
102

104
Id at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting), quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party
Doctrine, 107 Mich L Rev 561, 564 (2009).
105
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262–63 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting), quoting William Baude and
James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv L Rev 1821, 1872
(2016).
106

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).

12]

LOCATION TRACKING AND DIGITAL DATA

429

mensurable variables.107 But at least Justice Gorsuch graciously allowed
that the Carpenter majority’s doctrinal mishmash was not the Court’s
fault because, he opined, “this is where Katz inevitably leads.”108
Justice Gorsuch then spent the bulk of his opinion sketching out a
potential argument on Carpenter’s behalf that purported to protect
his privacy interests while remaining true to the traditional propertybased framework.109 The approach combines (1) old-school bailment
principles that demonstrate an individual does not necessarily abdicate Fourth Amendment protections for property merely by voluntarily sharing it, (2) a more recent recognition that positive law can
create property rights in intangible things such as digital records, and
(3) a speciﬁc claim that a federal statute prohibiting wireless carriers
from publicly sharing their customers’ location information110 might
be such a law.111 The combination, Justice Gorsuch suggested, might
give customers a form of bailed ownership interest such that the
CSLI records become (at least in part) their papers or effects for
Fourth Amendment purposes.112 And perhaps, he continued, this
model might generalize to other types of third-party digital records as
well. In the end, though, Justice Gorsuch dissented rather than concurred after concluding that Carpenter failed to present any property
or positive law-based claim in the courts below.113
107
108

Id at 2267 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
Id (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).

109
I plan to address more fully the promises and pitfalls of Justice Gorsuch’s proposed
approach in a separate essay. See Evan Caminker, Rebuilding Carpenter on Property Law
Foundations: Justice Gorsuch’s Proposed Approach to Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age (unpublished manuscript, 2018) (on ﬁle with author). Given interpretative trends and shifting
membership, this approach may reﬂect an ascendant position on the Court. In my view, while
Justice Gorsuch suggests creative ways to update the Olmstead approach to better address
privacy threats of the digital age, signiﬁcant questions remain.
110
111

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 USC § 222.

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2267–71 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
Id at 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). It is worth nothing that Justice Gorsuch would part
company here with his fellow dissenters, all of whom reject this conclusion. See id at 2229–30
(Kennedy, J, dissenting); id at 2242–43 (Thomas, J, dissenting); id at 2257–59 (Alito, J,
dissenting).
113
Carpenter’s new counsel (the ACLU) briefed this statutory claim to the Supreme Court.
Brief for Petitioner, Carpenter v United States, No 16-402, ∗33–35 (US, ﬁled Aug 7, 2017)
(available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 3575179) (“Carpenter Petr’s Brief ”). But Carpenter never
mentioned any statutory claim or broader property rights claim before either the district
court or court of appeals. Indeed, his district court brief supporting his motion to suppress
( joining his co-defendant) never once uses the word “property,” and his Sixth Circuit brief
uses the term only three times and only when describing the charged robberies. Defendant
Timothy Sanders’s Motion in Limine to Suppress Cell Phone Data, United States v Sanders,
112
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II. Building a New Search Doctrine for Cell Phone
Location Records
Carpenter’s majority (and Justice Gorsuch) clearly recognized
that current doctrinal protections do not “ﬁt neatly” with modern
forms of digital data or data analytics.114 Under the Katz-based approach, Chief Justice Roberts explained, “requests for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases”115―an odd locution
when the public and third-party exposure lines don’t intersect but
rather both lead directly away from Fourth Amendment protection.
But Roberts redirected both doctrinal paths, creating more ﬂexible
routes of reasoning that better respond to digital data’s oft-sensitive
nature and the circumstances of its sharing. And while Roberts described the Court’s doctrinal revisions as narrow, their rationales
appear to leave room for extension to a much broader set of digital
records and privacy concerns.
a. location information and the threat to privacy:
record, reality, and ruling for the future
Carpenter’s privacy claim is straightforward: Sprint’s CSLI records reveal his phone’s general location at many moments over a
long period of time, enabling someone studying those records to infer
some activities and associations he might rather keep conﬁdential.
CSLI’s capacity to threaten his personal privacy depends on how precisely it determines location, how frequently Sprint records phonetower connections, and for how long Sprint stores the data. Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion of the Court depicted CSLI as rivaling GPS
tracking in these respects, providing a “detailed chronicle” of a person’s
physical presence “every moment of every day for ﬁve years.”116
This alarming claim of “near perfect surveillance”117 is futuristic,
projecting well beyond the record data from 2011 and even beyond

Case No 12-cr-20218 (ED Mich, ﬁled Nov 21, 2013) ( joined by Carpenter); Appellant’s
Brief, United States v Carpenter, No 15-1572, ∗3, 41 (6th Cir, ﬁled Mar 2, 2015). So if the
doctrine of argument forfeiture means anything (a fair question), it surely applies here.
114
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214.
115

Id.

116

Id at 2220; id at 2218 (comparing phone to ankle monitor).
Id at 2218.

117
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present-day reality. To be sure, CSLI data are certainly trending
toward greater precision and frequency. But Chief Justice Roberts’s
willingness to pretend the future is already here (and likely exaggerate
it) suggests two things: ﬁrst, a desire to get ahead of the technology
curve rather than rule from behind, reﬂecting a regulatory rather than
atomistic attitude toward Fourth Amendment protection in this
context; and, second, an effort to describe the privacy intrusion as
particularly acute, so as to limit the precedential scope of the ruling.
1. Precision of recorded locations. Given the spacing of cell towers
where Carpenter made and received phone calls, the CSLI data merely
“locate[d] the defendants’ cellphones within a 120- (or sometimes 60-)
degree radial wedge extending between one-half mile and two miles in
length.”118 Those service areas are “between around a dozen and
several hundred city blocks” and “up to 40 times more imprecise” in
rural areas.119 And nothing indicates where in a particular service area
the phone was located at any point in time.120 The location information
in the record is therefore “as much as 12,500 times less accurate than
the GPS data in Jones.”121
And yet the Court felt unconstrained by the record, declaring that it
“‘must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in
use or in development.’”122 Even so, the Court seemed quite aggressive
in describing those systems as “rapidly approaching GPS-level preci-

118

Carpenter v United States, 819 F3d 880, 889 (6th Cir 2016).

119

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2225 (Kennedy, J, dissenting); see also Stephen E. Henderson,
Carpenter v. United States and the Fourth Amendment: The Best Way Forward, 26 Wm & Mary Bill
of Rts J 495, 501 (2017) (calculating service area to range from 0.1 square miles to 4.2 square
miles).
120
See Joint Appendix, United States v Carpenter, No 16-402, ∗86–88 (US ﬁled Aug 7, 2017)
(available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 3614549) (“Carpenter Appendix”) (testimony of Agent
Hess): “Q: [Y]ou are not able to say that the phone was at a particular place, right? A:
Correct. Q: What you would really say at best is that it is somewhere within that area that
could be a half-mile to a mile in distance from the tower and then [as wide as the far crossing
line] connecting those two, right? A: Right. . . . [The phone] would be within the footprint of
that tower on that sector.”
121
Carpenter, 819 F3d at 889. The Court protested that the government could “deduce”
when Carpenter “was at the site of the robberies,” information “accurate enough to highlight” during closing argument. Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218. Yes—except the prosecutor’s
reference to “at the site” meant nothing more than somewhere in the “exact” or “right
sector” for a nearby cell tower. Carpenter Appendix at ∗56 (cited in note 120) (government’s
closing argument).
122
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218, quoting Kyllo, 533 US at 36.
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sion.”123 Since Carpenter’s crime spree, carriers have installed more
cell sites so that “the geographic area covered by each cell sector has
shrunk, particularly in urban areas.”124 But how much will service areas
likely continue to shrink? Even six times the present would leave most
service areas measuring two to ﬁfty blocks.125 And what about other
technological developments that might slow or reverse this trend by
reducing reliance on local cell-site connections?126
The Court pointed to “new technology measuring the time and
angle of signals hitting their towers” giving carriers “the capability to
pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 meters.”127 But the cited briefs
contain scant evidence that these newer capabilities will ever be regularly used (except when law enforcement requests real-time tracking),
or the resulting data will be regularly recorded and stored.128 The most
supportive data show that Verizon keeps more-precise-than-mereservice-area data for just eight days,129 and one can only speculate if and

123
124

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.
Id.

125
Carpenter’s own data source (updated) reports a 52 percent increase in cell sites over the
past decade (to 323,448) by the end of 2017, and projects another 800,000 or so small cells
(typically deployed on streetlights or utility poles, with much smaller service areas) by 2026.
CTIA, The State of Wireless 2018 ∗20 (2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7QGZ-6EKA. As
implied, small cells create much smaller service areas, such as “one ﬂoor of a building, the
waiting room of an ofﬁce, or a single home,” Graham v United States, 824 F3d 421, 448 (4th Cir
2016) (en banc) (Wynn dissenting).
126
Brief for the United States, United States v Carpenter, No 16-402, ∗27 (US ﬁled Sept 25,
2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 4311113) (“Carpenter US Brief ”) (discussing deviceto-device calling and wi-ﬁ calling, neither of which creates CSLI). See, for example, Tom
Simonite, Future Smartphones Won’t Need Cell Towers to Connect (MIT Tech Rev, Sept 29,
2014), archived at https://perma.cc/HH7T-HZY8 (discussing device-to-device direct connections for shorter-distance data connections).
127
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219, citing Brief for Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al, United States v Carpenter, No 16-402, ∗12 (US ﬁled Aug 14, 2017) (available on
Westlaw at 2017 WL 4512266) (“Carpenter EFF Amici Brief ”). This claim of precision
depends on the distance between cell towers. For example, see Phil Locke, Cell Tower
Triangulation―How It Works (Wrongful Conviction Blog, June 1, 2012), archived at https://
perma.cc/R8FK-FYUT (concluding from triangulation modeling “it is possible to determine
a phone location to within an area of ‘about’ ¾ square mile[s]”).
128
For example, the amicus brief the Court cited for this capability in turn cites congressional testimony that describes the process but says only that any use or recording of such
data depends on individual carriers’ policies, which are not described. Carpenter EFF Amici
Brief at ∗11 & n 24 (cited in note 127).
129
Craig Silliman, Technology and Shifting Privacy Expectations ( Perspective) (Bloomberg
Law, Oct 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/N8N4-XJV5; see also Tom Jackman, Experts
Say Law Enforcement’s Use of Cellphone Records Can Be Inaccurate (Wash Post, June 27, 2014),
archived at https://perma.cc/8PU6-2F9B (observing “phone companies do not save GPS or
triangulation for an individual phone”).
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when carriers will ﬁnd business reasons to record and store more
precise location records for long periods of time.130
2. Frequency of recorded connections. The records in this case
showed Carpenter’s phone connections only when he made or received phone calls.131 Admittedly, Carpenter apparently breathed
through his phone, making or receiving enough calls to average 101
recorded connections per day132—well above average.133
Chief Justice Roberts characterized Carpenter’s monitoring as far
more continuous, claiming that his carriers recorded his cell-tower
and sector usage “[e]ach time the phone connects to a cell site.”134
This parrots Carpenter’s and his amici’s non-record-based (and hence
not adversarially tested) assertions that “in recent years phone companies have also collected location information from the transmission
of text messages and routine data connections.”135 “Collected,” perhaps; but the sources cited in Carpenter’s and supportive amici briefs
do not connect the dots all the way to long-term storage that would

130
See Henderson, 26 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J at 498 n 19 (cited in note 119) (“But such a
precise location [using triangulation and signal strength] will typically not be calculated, let
alone recorded in records later received by law enforcement, at least not based upon current
business practices.”).
An online search for recent federal or state decisions indicating that the government
had requested and received historical CSLI data reﬂecting such triangulation technology
reveals none. A few courts discuss such technology only to clarify that the produced records did
not include any pinpoint location data. See, for example, Zanders v State, 73 NE3d 178, 182 (Ind
2017) (discussing triangulation and other technologies but noting that no “high-resolution location data” were involved in case); Commonwealth v Augustine, 4 NE3d 846, 855 (Mass 2014)
(same). Agents sometimes request triangulation to assist with prospective or “real-time” CSLI
tracking. See, for example, United States v Alarcon, 2016 WL 2844164, ∗1 (D Minn).
131
That’s all the government asked for. See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2212; Carpenter US Brief
at ∗7 (cited in note 126) (“The records . . . did not contain any cell-site information for text
messages or for times when petitioner’s phone was turned on but was not being used to
connect a call.”). And indeed that’s all Sprint and MetroPCS recorded. Id.
132

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2212.
A year earlier the average was ten connections per day (ﬁve calls). See Amanda Lenhart,
Cell Phones and American Adults (Pew Research Center, Sept 2, 2010), archived at https://
perma.cc/DSM6-XXMH.
134
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2211; id at 2212 (repeated almost verbatim). The Court attributed
this claim to FBI Agent Hess’s trial testimony, id at 2212, and yet Hess was crystal clear that
by “connection” he meant only actively making or receiving phone calls. Carpenter Appendix
at ∗61 (cited in note 120) (testimony of Agent Hess) (“Q: So if the phone is just in my pocket,
and I’m not calling and no one is calling me, you couldn’t really do this? A: Right. It’s not
populated in the call detail records. Q: Even though it might be communicating in there, —
A: That’s correct.”).
133

135

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2212.
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produce records covering “every moment of every day for ﬁve
years.”136
This projection of continuous long-term CSLI monitoring is, at a
minimum, overconﬁdent. It will probably soon be true for some
people at some times in some places; but it is generally still quite a way
off.
3. What can CSLI reveal? Location data threaten privacy to the
extent an observer can (1) compare tower service areas with local maps
and (2) determine what places the target visited and how long she
stayed there and then (3) infer what she might have been doing there
and why.137 The Court warned that, “[a]s with GPS information, the
time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life,
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”138
But this GPS comparison exaggerates the capacity for (2) and (3)
above. On this record, the typical service area for Carpenter’s CSLI
“contains about 1000 buildings.”139 Cut that in half—indeed, cut it in
hundreds—it’s still hard to infer these details with any conﬁdence. So
current or even near-future projected CSLI records cannot easily
determine the kinds of personal associations about which the Court
expressed worry, at least not without signiﬁcant nonlocation data
obtained elsewhere.140
That said, there is no question that current CSLI can be used to
infer with reasonable conﬁdence some sensitive facts. For example,
even imprecise data can reveal whether the target visits the same
general locations repeatedly, or not. And imprecise data can indicate
where a cell phone is not (not near one’s workplace during the day,
136

Id at 2218.

137

The Court rhetorically embellishes the capacity to infer by repeatedly describing CSLI
location monitoring as “surveillance.” See, for example, Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217–18. That
term implies “being watched,” as if CSLI can determine not just where you are located
(however precisely), but also what you are doing and with whom, as opposed to leaving this to
inference. Of course, that is not what the data show.
138
139

Id at 2217, quoting Jones, 565 US at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
Carpenter US Brief at ∗25 (cited in note 126).

140
For example, while the ACLU claimed before the Sixth Circuit that Carpenter’s cell
phone records placed him at church at a particular time, that claim was based partly on information Carpenter himself provided rather than only on the records themselves. See
Carpenter 6th Cir Brief at 33 n 4. Without such additional information, CSLI data “does not
paint the ‘intimate portrait of personal, social, religious, medical, and other activities and
interactions’” that Carpenter claims. United States v Davis, 785 F3d 498, 515 (11th Cir 2015)
(en banc) (citation omitted).
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not near one’s home all night). Moreover, the Court may appropriately worry about current trends. Surely the Court correctly
concluded that CSLI “has afforded law enforcement a powerful new
tool” that “risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers . . . drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”141
4. Record, reality, and ruling for the future. Given clear trends
and risks, why did Chief Justice Roberts apparently feel a need to
embellish CSLI’s actual level of intrusion, both in terms of precision and continuity? Perhaps for two reasons.
First, the aggressive depiction of CSLI tracking suggests a regulatory
approach to privacy doctrine, reﬂecting a desire to cabin worrisome
surveillance even before the technology reaches highly invasive levels.
Given the typical time lag between the development/deployment of
new privacy-threatening technology and judicial (especially Supreme
Court) review, law enforcement activities might well impinge upon
should-be-protected privacy interests for quite some time before courts
conﬁned to actual record-based threats catch up.142 The desire to
forestall a “‘too permeating police surveillance’”143 heralds an increasingly regulatory approach to modern surveillance threats, leading the
Court to anticipate protections required for atomistic privacy values.
To be sure, the Court does not always rule forward in this manner.144 Hesitation in the face of technology lag may reﬂect hope that
141
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2223 (emphasis added). The far greater risk here involves a
myriad and growing number of cell phone applications whose operators collect phone users’
location information, sometimes to deliver tailored services (such as local weather news or
driving directions) but oftentimes just to collect the information so they can sell it en masse to
companies for commercial purposes (such as to provide businesses and advertisers with clues
about consumer behavior). Again it’s not clear that the app operators store the information in
user-identiﬁable form; rather, the data are typically anonymized before bulk resale. But in
some cases a dedicated analyst, once armed with a lot of other facts about particular people’s
movements and location patterns, can reverse-engineer educated guesses as to which individuals actually made which tracked movements. These apps frequently track location through
GPS coordinates, far more precise than CSLI. See, for example, Jennifer Valentino-DeVries
et al, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret (NYT,
Dec 10, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/98FB-KTXZ (discussing practices and providing
examples). Of course, while not necessarily easy to do, users can adjust their cell phone settings
to disable the location services that enable such tracking, either wholesale or piecemeal and
either indeﬁnitely or for particular periods of time. Id.
142
See, for example, Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94
Wash U L Rev 1441, 1448, 1464–65 (2017) (describing and applying the “Fourth Amendment lag problem” to digital data and related technology).
143
144

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214 (citation omitted).

See, for example, Maryland v King, 569 US 435, 464 (2013) ( joined by Roberts, CJ)
(refusing to consider future improvements in DNA testing that might further compromise
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legislative bodies, arguably better suited to project and regulate for
the future, will step up.145 But given the conjectured technology
growth curve and no congressional action in sight, the Court may
reasonably have thought the time to intervene was now.
Of course, Chief Justice Roberts could have candidly recognized
that both the monitoring to which Carpenter was actually subjected
and the most common location monitoring available today remain
quite imprecise and episodic compared to GPS-level tracking, and
yet still expressed concern for doctrinal time lag as a reason to rule
forward by modifying doctrine prophylactically. Lack of candor
comes with a cost; the Court’s exaggerated claims will likely be accepted at face value by lower courts, and the underlying technological
reality will continue to escape judicial scrutiny.146
But here lies the second possible motive for embellishment. The
more precise and continuous the Court depicts CSLI tracking, the
easier it is to claim both that it violates reasonable expectations of
privacy, and that it is distinguishable from more conventional surveillance techniques and other types of third-party records. Let’s now
see how strong those claims are.
b. a mosaic privacy interest in the “whole of one’s
public movements”
Given this futuristic description of CSLI data, the Court easily
found that historical location monitoring implicates a Katz-based
privacy interest. The more difﬁcult question is whether that interest
dissipates because the phone user shares his location information, either with the public around him or with Sprint.

privacy, despite acknowledging that “science can always progress further, and those progressions may have Fourth Amendment consequences”); Silverman v United States, 365 US 505, 508–
9 (1961) (refusing to consider “recent and projected developments in the science of electronics”
despite foreseeable “Fourth Amendment implications of these and other frightening paraphernalia”).
145
See, for example, Jeffrey S. Sutton, Courts, Rights, and New Technology: Judging in an
Ever-Changing World, 8 NYU J L & Lib 261, 274–75 (2014) (although “courts have no license to abdicate their duty to enforce constitutional guarantees based on the complexities of
new technology,” there are virtues associated with deferring to (and presumably encouraging)
legislative intervention).
146
See, for example, United States v Curtis, 901 F3d 846, 847 (7th Cir 2018) (accepting without question that CSLI “is capable of ‘pinpoint[ing] a phone’s location within 50 meters’ ” and
carriers “can collect CSLI as frequently as several times a minute”), quoting and then citing
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219, 2211–12.
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The “public exposure” doctrine holds that people lack a reasonable
expectation of privacy in movements or activities that they publicly
expose to “anyone who wants to look.”147 The majority in Carpenter,
however, embraced a form of the mosaic approach championed by
the shadow majority of concurring Justices in Jones, and announced
that heretofore “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the whole of their physical movements.”148 In other words, while each
public movement may be exposed and hence unprotected by Katz, the
aggregate of such movements may qualify for Fourth Amendment
protection. Given that “[t]he sum of an inﬁnite number of zero-value
parts is also zero,”149 how did the Court add this up?
First, Chief Justice Roberts redeﬁned the question. Rather than
follow Katz and Knotts by asking whether public sojourners reasonably expect they are exposing their discrete movements to any one,
meaning to different people at different places and times,150 the Court
in Carpenter asked whether the sojourners reasonably expect they are
exposing their entire set of movements to any one, meaning to a single
person who sees it all. The question shifted from what bits and pieces
of information the sojourners knowingly reveal to random people, to
what they might expect a single-but-dedicated viewer to learn from
what they reveal.
And the Court answered “not so much.” Personal surveillance by
law enforcement or private tails using only conventional tools and
techniques is both difﬁcult and costly. As a result, people reasonably
expect that “law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue
every single movement of an [individual] for a very long period.”151
So, while people do not reasonably expect privacy in any discrete
movement (or perhaps a short series of movements), people do reasonably expect that no one is systematically viewing the “whole” of

147
148

See text accompanying notes 38–40.
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217 (emphasis added).

149
United States v Jones, 625 F3d 766, 769 (DC Cir 2010) (Sentelle dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
150
See Katz, 389 US at 351 (exposure to “public”); id at 361 (Harlan, J, concurring) (exposure to “outsiders”); Knotts, 468 US at 281 (exposure to “anyone who wanted to look”).
151
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217, quoting Jones, 565 US at 430 (Alito, J, concurring in the
judgment).
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their physical movements over any extended period of time.152 Even
for the police, this is wildly inefﬁcient except in extraordinary circumstances.
Second, Roberts emphasized the potential sensitivity of location
information. Knowing all of someone’s movements, a dedicated
viewer might be able to construct a “mosaic” of discrete data points
from which to infer things about the sojourner that society reasonably believes she should be able to keep to herself—such as her “‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”153
Third, Roberts highlighted how easily government can leverage
Sprint’s CSLI-based monitoring powers. Compared to both “nosy
neighbors” and government agents using traditional surveillance
techniques, Sprint is a potentially super-powerful tracker due to
features of CSLI technology. After all, “[c]ell phone tracking” by the
government “is remarkably easy, cheap, and efﬁcient”154 because
Sprint has already done the work. Moreover, the ability to search
stored records “gives police access to a category of information
otherwise unknowable.”155 Normally, agents can surveil targets only
from the moment of suspicion and going forward; stored CSLI data
let agents “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts.”156
Although police can always interview eyewitnesses about a suspect’s
prior movements, such efforts are limited by “the frailties of recollection,”157 whereas Sprint’s memory is “nearly infallible.”158 Another
consideration, unmentioned by the Court, is that agents seeking to
reconstruct someone’s prior movements may have a hard time ﬁguring out who might be plausible human eyewitnesses to interview,
but the agents can easily consult the universe of plausibly “witnessing” service providers. In sum, government access to Sprint’s records
will almost assuredly reveal a more comprehensive and accurate story
of the target’s movements than whatever can likely be pieced together

152

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217.

153

Id, quoting Jones, 565 US at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217–18; see also id at 2218 (asserting government can access
CSLI “at practically no expense”).
154

155
156

Id.
Id.

157

Id.

158

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.
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through more traditional investigative efforts—precisely why the
government wants such access.
The Court’s ﬁrst-ever embrace of a mosaic-deﬁned search has
been roundly praised by privacy advocates clamoring for change, and
it is truly a signiﬁcant doctrinal shift. And perhaps not surprisingly, as
an initial step in a novel direction, the majority opinion is undertheorized, or at least underexplained. Most fundamentally, the Court
did not address or resolve the long-standing conceptual ambiguity
underlying Katz that so frustrated the dissents. Does the mosaic test
assess empirical expectations—suggesting that when I walk down the
street, I don’t predict that a single person will see my entire route even
though I do predict that lots of different people may collectively see
every single step along the way? Or does the test reﬂect a normative
standard—suggesting that I shouldn’t assume the risk that any one
person will see the entire route (thereby potentially learning something about my familial/political/professional/religious/sexual afﬁliations or proclivities), even though I assume the risk that each step is
discretely revealed? Nor did the Court clarify an ambiguity raised by
Jones’s separate opinions by specifying the baseline against which it
measures how much monitoring information—whether assessed empirically or normatively—is too much. Is the mosaic-triggered privacy
interest invaded when I am monitored for a longer period than I
(would or should) expect to be seen by law enforcement ofﬁcers trying
to surveil me; or for a longer period than I (would or should) expect to
be seen by a single “nosy neighbor”?159 Perhaps we will learn more as
the doctrine unfolds; but the Court may leave well enough alone,
159
Rather than pick one baseline, the Court referred to both: society expects that “law
enforcement agents and others would not” and could not monitor the target’s entire journey.
Id at 2217 (emphasis added). But whether viewed empirically or normatively, these baselines
might be quite different. Orin Kerr, for example, traces the law enforcement baseline to
Justice Alito in Jones, traces the private “others” baseline to the court of appeals in that case,
traces yet a third baseline (when the government can learn intimate details “more or less at
will”) to Justice Sotomayor in Jones, notes that the approaches are materially different, and
further pinpoints ambiguities within each formulation. Kerr, 111 Mich L Rev at 330–31
(cited in note 50). By acting as if the Jones shadow majority had already established the “whole
of one’s public movements” principle, the Carpenter Court avoided the need to explain its
views further.
The approach previously espoused by Justice Alito in Jones, employing a what-would-lawenforcement-do-through-traditional-surveillance baseline, might hinge (empirical or normative) expectations to the crime being investigated. He ponders whether the more serious the
offense, the longer and more intense surveillance would/should be expected. Jones, 565 US at
431 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment). This would add another conceptual trick. The
Fourth Amendment protects innocent people too, but how can one of them possibly speculate
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sidestepping these underlying questions as it has done with Katz for
decades.160
The mosaic approach, by its very nature, invites line-drawing to
distinguish location monitoring that reveals the “whole of one’s
public movements” from monitoring that merely reveals discrete
“publicly exposed” movements unprotected under Knotts. The rationale for mosaic-based protection does not justify covering shorterterm CSLI requests. The fewer location data points available, the
harder it is to discern patterns or sequences and therefore to infer
particular activities, and the more likely it is the target could reasonably expect (empirically and normatively) to be personally viewed
throughout that period.161
As with other doctrinal questions that hinge on aggregated events
or the passage of time (for example, how long may a nonwarrant
arrestee be detained prior to a judicial probable cause determination162), the Court must establish some cut-off point for when Knottsapproved monitoring ends and search-triggering monitoring begins.
In Carpenter, the Court proclaimed that “accessing seven days of
CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,” leaving for another
about how long she would/should expect to be surveilled if she needs to know the severity of an
offense she did not commit?
Throughout this discussion the Court also implicitly evinced little care for Katz’s “subjective
expectation of privacy” component. The Court concluded that Carpenter did not truly expose
his long-term location information in the relevant sense; but the Court seemed entirely
uninterested in whether Carpenter manifested any intent to keep to himself the underlying
kinds of information the Court worried his movements will reveal. For all we know, Carpenter
was quite open about his family relations, political views, professional associations, religious
views and practices, and sexual interests―perhaps all revealed through his Facebook postings
and personal attire (such as wearing a cross or yarmulke, rainbow pin, and gang colors). See
generally Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U
Chi L Rev 113 (2015) (observing demise of subjective test).
160
That said, the obvious difﬁculties applying the empirical baseline to any speciﬁc instance
of long-term monitoring, see United States v Cuevas-Perez, 640 F3d 272, 282–83 (7th Cir
2011) (Flaum concurring) (concluding “probabilistic” mosaic approach is “unworkable”),
coupled with the Court’s not doing so here, strongly suggests the Carpenter majority is
thinking in normative terms.
161
As Justice Alito concluded in Jones, “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.” 565 US at 430 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment). Even Justice
Sotomayor, who in Jones ﬂagged her concern about “short-term” as well as “longer term”
GPS monitoring, id at 415–17 (Sotomayor, J, concurring), still recognized that only “aggregated” records of movements could generate privacy-threatening inferences. Id at 416; see
also id at 415 (expressing concern over “comprehensive record of a person’s public movements”);
id at 416 (expressing concern over “substantial quantum of intimate information”).
162
See Riverside v McLaughlin, 500 US 44 (1991) (imposing presumptive forty-eight-hour
limit to detention before postarrest probable cause hearing).
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day whether government may obtain historical CSLI for a shorter
period “free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long
that period might be.”163 One could imagine the Court ultimately
embracing a broad prophylactic rule that any CLSI request constitutes a search, in part to avoid the appearance of drawing arbitrary
lines.164 I anticipate, however, that the Court will maintain some cutoff point—likely a week, but at least a day or two—both to reﬂect the
underlying mosaic-based justiﬁcation and, as described below, to
balance privacy with law enforcement interests.165
Of course, any such cut-off point raises further line-drawing issues
as well—some raised by many duration-deﬁned doctrines,166 but
others tailored to the novelty of applying a mosaic approach to law
enforcement. Traditionally, courts have looked at a discrete interaction between police and a person or tetrad object and asked
163
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217 n 3. The Court apparently focused on a week because the
shorter of the two records requests was for a week’s worth of data. See id. The Court did not
address Justice Gorsuch’s poke that Sprint provided only two days of records (because
Carpenter’s trip to Ohio that triggered roaming was brief ) and his query why the search
should be measured by the information requested rather than the information actually acquired. See id at 2266–67 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
164
The Court could have also reached this point through a different route, ruling that any
CSLI is too much based on a concern about tracking targets in private homes. In United
States v Karo, 468 US 705 (1984), the Court cabined Knotts and held that location monitoring
becomes a search when it ﬁxes the target in a private residence such that the government
learns “a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government . . . could not
have otherwise obtained without a warrant.” Id at 715. If the Court doubled down on its
claim of GPS-like precision, CSLI could suggest that the target entered a home. Because
ofﬁcials would have no way of predicting that in advance, the records might contain some
Fourth Amendment–protected as well as some publicly exposed data points. See Tracey v
Florida, 152 So3d 504, 524 (2014). To be sure, the Court in Karo held the public data pings
admissible while suppressing the private pings. But on those different facts it was easy to
separate the two; here it might be very difﬁcult. Moreover, a broader prophylactic rule would
better protect targets who never become criminal defendants.
165
See text accompanying note 266. Requiring a warrant for short-term CSLI monitoring
might hinder criminal investigations much more severely than requiring a warrant only for
long-term monitoring.
The non-search status for short-term historical monitoring should also apply to short-term
tracking deployed to locate a target in real time. Such tracking might aid law enforcement in
arresting her, or rescuing a kidnapping victim, or even providing an alibi for a recent crime. But
a short sequence of location ﬁxes (whether through cell tower usage or GPS pings) hardly seems
sufﬁcient to lay bare her “privacies of life” by revealing the “whole” of her public movements.
166
For example, consider remedies. Agents do not search me when they obtain six consecutive days of Sprint’s CSLI records for my phone, but they search you when they obtain seven
consecutive days. Is your exclusionary rule remedy suppressing records for all seven days, or
only the seventh (or perhaps only the ﬁrst, or only one day of your choice, or of the government’s
choice)? Is your civil remedy damages for one day or one week of illegal searching? Put differently, have you suffered a single indivisible illegal search, or a legal search for six days and an
illegal one for the seventh?
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whether that interaction constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.
Here, we’re left wondering whether that’s still true (such that only a
single long-term records request from a single third party can create a
search-triggering mosaic), or whether a search can be produced by
the aggregation of different enforcement activities across time, motives, sovereigns, technologies, etc. For example, suppose Agent Amy
requests ﬁve days of Sprint’s records for your phone. When, if at all,
may Agent Barb later ask Sprint for the next three days? Never? Only
after a certain amount of time has elapsed? Only when investigating a
different crime? Only if Agent Barb represents a different law enforcement agency, or even a different sovereign? And what if two
different third-party carriers are involved: suppose given your movements and roaming your phone connects to Sprint towers for four
consecutive days and then MetroPCS towers for the next four. Agent
Carol requests these four-day series of records from both Sprint and
MetroPCS. Both carriers have been searched;167 have you?168
An atomistic view of mosaic theory supports aggregating all of
these various information requests for the purpose of deﬁning a
search—from your perspective, you don’t care whether your nosy
neighbor or the police have pieced together the privacy-threatening
mosaic from one long stare or many momentary glances. But that
means that whether Agent Esther searches you may depend on the
completely independent and even then-unknown interactions between many other agents and many other third parties. That’s conceptually unsettling, to say the least, let alone a pragmatic quagmire
both for ofﬁcers trying to comply with the Fourth Amendment
and for courts trying to sort things through after the fact. I suspect
here again that a regulatory perspective will win the day, with the
167
Though subject only to the much relaxed standard for document subpoenas. See text
accompanying notes 281–82.
168
To press the point even further, consider aggregating requests for different kinds of
third-party records. For a week-long period, Agent Darcy requests records revealing some of
your credit card purchases, some swipes of your building entrance passkey, some passages on
toll roads, and some internet protocol addresses, and then she views some surveillance tapes
from near your house and ofﬁce—all of which directly or incidentally reveal timed location
information, and which collectively add up to 101 data points per day to match Carpenter’s
proliﬁc phone use. Now all of those third parties have been searched; again, have you?
For other pragmatic challenges posed by mosaic-required line drawing, see Kerr, 111 Mich
L Rev at 328–43, 346–48, 330–31 (cited in note 50); Lucas Issacharoff and Kyle Wirshba,
Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 Minn L Rev 987, 1003 (2016) (concluding that
mosaic theory “works better as a metaphor than as a constitutional doctrine” due to “impracticality as an administrable standard”).
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Court favoring easier-to-implement bright-line rules over harder-tomeasure-and-enforce aggregation rules, even though the latter more
directly track atomistic and mosaic-deﬁned privacy concerns.
c. modifying the miller-smith third-party doctrine
to protect csli records
So Carpenter’s legitimate claim to privacy in the whole of his
public movements overcame Katz’s caveat about publicly exposed
activities. But he still faced the third-party doctrine’s independent
caveat that “‘a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties’” even just “‘for a
limited purpose,’”169 and therefore acquiring such information is not
a Fourth Amendment search.
As noted earlier, the Miller-Smith mantra that voluntary sharing
automatically defeases privacy has been criticized by scholars on a
wide variety of grounds,170 some echoed by Justice Gorsuch’s dissent.171 As an empirical statement of the expectations people generally
hold, the doctrine is “quite dubious”;172 surely at least sometimes we
expect people or even companies to keep our shared private information to themselves.173 And as a normative statement of when
people are entitled to expect postsharing privacy, “the notion that the
answer might be ‘never’ seems a pretty unattractive societal prescription.”174 Scholars have proposed many different rules to determine

169
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2216, quoting Smith, 442 US at 743–44, and then Miller, 425 US
at 443.
170
For a small subset of voluminous critical commentary, see Kerr, 107 Mich L Rev at 563
n 5 (cited in note 104) (collecting sources criticizing the doctrine); Jane Bambauer, Other
People’s Papers, 94 Tex L Rev 205, 208 & n 18 and 214–15 nn 50–51 (2015) (criticizing
doctrine and collecting sources).
171

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262–63 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
Id at 2263 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting), quoting Baude and Stern, 129 Harv L Rev at 1872
(cited in note 105); see also Kugler and Strahilevitz, 2015 Supreme Court Review at 255
(cited in note 49) (explaining survey data indicate third-party doctrine holds disproportionate
appeal to older Americans and has an “apparent lack of resonance with younger Americans”).
173
Context matters: if I tell a friend funny stories about my addiction to college football, I’d
generally expect her (absent special admonition) to share them with whomever she sees ﬁt;
but if I tell her painful stories about emotional anxieties, I’d generally expect her to keep quiet
or perhaps share only with her spouse. And the down-the-line recipient matters: if I confess
suicidal thoughts, I’d expect my friend to keep quiet if I insist or perhaps reveal them to my
wife or an appropriate caretaker, but not reveal them to my students or my young children.
172

174
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2263 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting); see id at 2262–64 (canvassing and
critiquing application of various assumption-of-risk norms). When the Court acknowledged
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when sharing does not extinguish privacy interests.175 Whatever the
best approach,176 it is difﬁcult to rally around a simplistic, binary answer―other than for the sake of being simplistic and binary.177 While
voluntarily sharing “objects, activities, or statements” with others may
sometimes extinguish privacy interests under Katz because “no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited,”178 the properly nuanced question is when and why.
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts did not accept Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion in Jones that the Court “reconsider” the entire
third-party doctrine as being “ill-suited to the digital age.”179 But
Roberts conﬁdently announced that the Court “decline[d] to extend
Smith and Miller to cover these novel circumstances” and that the
information’s possession by a third party “does not by itself overcome” the user’s Fourth Amendment claim.180 Roberts offered two
reasons not to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI: the information revealed was both highly sensitive and not truly shared volunin Katz that a person cannot claim Fourth Amendment protection for things she “knowingly
exposes to the public,” 389 US at 351, the Court may well have considered only remarks/
activities shared with natural persons, including both any intended recipients of the remarks
or viewers of the activities, and also any inadvertent hearers or viewers in a private home or
public space such as a park or restaurant. When nine years later Miller extrapolated this
assumption of risk to encompass information exposed to business entities, changed membership may have made the Court less attuned to privacy interests (though Justices Stewart
and White were in the majority for both decisions).
175
For example, sharing with a company via automated processes where the information is
not typically monitored by people, sharing with a person or company who is an “information
ﬁduciary” owing an obligation of silence, sharing information that is particularly sensitive,
sharing information for clearly limited purposes, and more. See, for example, Susan Brenner
and Leo Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional
Data, 14 J L & Pol 211, 215–16 (2006) (sharing should not trigger third-party doctrine if
customer has broadly deﬁned “trust-based” relationship and a conﬁdentiality agreement with
the third party and if the data are maintained at least in part for and are accessible by the
customer).
176
I’m inclined to frame the question this way: if you share information A with person B
under circumstances C, do you have a right to complain if B shares your information with
person D under circumstances E? That is more a normative than empirical inquiry, though
empirics about observed social norms play a role. Borrowing an example from my colleague
Don Herzog, I suspect it is pretty unusual for a stranger to poke around in the garbage I place
on the curb for pickup, and I would think it quite weird if one did so; but I also think I
couldn’t persuasively complain that she violated my right of privacy.
177
And as Justice Gorsuch notes, privacy “always wins” is just as clear as “always loses.”
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2264 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
178
Katz, 389 US at 361 (Harlan, J, concurring).
179
Jones, 565 US at 417 (Sotomayor, J, concurring); id at 418 (suggesting doctrine should
“cease[ ] to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy”).
180

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217 (emphasis added).
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tarily. Because the latter is more traditional terrain, I will address that
argument ﬁrst.
1. Protecting involuntarily shared information. The Court offered
two seemingly simple reasons why Carpenter cannot reasonably be
said to have “voluntarily” shared his location information with Sprint.
But neither the reasons nor their analytical roles are as simple as they
ﬁrst appear.
Here are the Court’s two arguments in their entirety as to why
“[c]ell phone location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”181 First, what I will call the macroinvoluntary argument: “cell phones and the services they provide are
‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is
indispensable to participation in modern society.”182 And, second,
what I will call the micro-involuntary argument:
[A] cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any
afﬁrmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any
activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or
e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically
makes when checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart
from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data.183

Thus, Roberts reasoned, “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of
his physical movements.”184
The macro-involuntary argument says everyone needs a cell phone
today. Because you need to use your phone, doing so ought not be
viewed as a volitional act that “voluntarily” shares the information
required to make the phone work.
This is a normative rather than factual claim. The Court cannot
mean that using a cell phone is literally indispensable to modern life;
until quite recently we managed to survive without one. That said,
smartphones surely make negotiating daily activities signiﬁcantly
easier, more efﬁcient, more fun, and even safer for all the obvious
reasons—constant communicability, easier information retrieval,

181
182

Id at 2220.
Id, quoting Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473, 2484 (2014).

183

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2220.

184

Id at 2220, quoting Smith, 442 US at 745.
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faster driving directions, instant Starbucks gratiﬁcation, and the like.
The Court makes a normative judgment that a cell phone’s important
and convenient functions are so compelling today that we act as if we
have no real choice, despite the downside of enabling location monitoring. Frankly, I act that way too: I carry my phone everywhere I go,
as long as my teenage daughters are around to remind me how to use
it. As a matter of social reality, the Court’s judgment strikes me as
reasonable.185
That said, I think the dissents in Miller and Smith were equally
reasonable in claiming that people must use banks and landlines.186
The Court in Carpenter offered no reason to distinguish among these
arguable imperatives of daily life, nor thoughts on the comparative
societal necessity of using credit cards, computers, cars, or cardiologists. So whether the macro-involuntary argument implicates any
of these core features of modern living is not yet clear.
Perhaps the Court’s micro-involuntary argument distinguishes
CSLI from the rest: cell phones constantly communicate your location “without any afﬁrmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up.”187 The point, I gather, is that you can’t effectively selfregulate to control when or whether you share your location, without
turning your phone off. If the Court’s view is that its macro- and
micro-level arguments together distinguish Miller-Smith (and other
third-party digital data), that’s probably right. You volitionally provide documents to (or today establish internet connections with) your
bank, you dial phones, you swipe or hand over credit cards, you conﬁde
in your cardiologist, etc. Maybe some background computer func185
Though the conclusion that we all need our cell phones also strikes me as for-this-trainonly; somehow I doubt the Court will now conclude that all service-provider agreements are
contracts of adhesion.
186
See Miller, 425 US at 451 (Brennan, J, dissenting) (“[I]t is impossible to participate in
the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”) (citation
omitted); Smith, 442 US at 750 (Marshall, J, dissenting) (claiming that using landline phones
“for many has become a personal or professional necessity” and “individuals have no realistic
alternative”); see also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2233 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“[T]he decision
whether to transact with banks and credit card companies is no more or less voluntary than
the decision whether to use a cell phone.”).
Of course, there were alternative ways to keep some speciﬁc transactions private in the 1970s;
you could pay for your mistress’s abortion using cash or a traveler’s check, and schedule that
abortion from the corner payphone. Similarly, for discrete and highly sensitive trips today, you
can temporarily place your phone in airplane mode.
187
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2220. Again, this assumes, outside the record, that carriers
routinely record such data exchanges other than incoming and outgoing phone calls (which
clearly require afﬁrmative acts).
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tions and car black-box communications are equally automated,
but perhaps even they fail the micro-involuntary test because, unlike
phone connections, you intentionally turn on your laptops and start
your cars before you use them.
But it is not clear that the Court intends to exclude from the thirdparty doctrine only technologies that are both socially necessary and
automated. The two exceptions don’t ﬁt well together. If you have no
(socially realistic) choice but to use a cell phone that lets your carrier
track your location, why should the Court additionally insist for
Fourth Amendment protection that the device transmits information
automatically? It seems odd to conclude that you still voluntarily
share your location for third-party doctrine purposes even when you
intentionally place a call knowing that doing so triggers a record,
when your making such phone calls “is indispensable” to modern
living.
Alternatively, perhaps the Court views its macro- and microinvoluntary arguments as separately sufﬁcient (rather than jointly
necessary) to exempt technology from the Miller-Smith rule. Understood this way, you would waive your reasonable expectation of
privacy only if you both enjoyed and exercised a real choice to use a
cell phone in the ﬁrst place, and did something volitional each time
that your phone generates CSLI. This alternative reading is far more
privacy-protective, further narrowing the sharing exception to Katz.
But as noted above, it raises questions about the continuing vitality of
Miller and Smith themselves given the realistic need to use banks and
phones.188

188
Consider this four-square comparison, which for the sake of illustration assumes that
credit cards are “indispensable” for modern living but Fitbit health monitors and voiceactivated TVs are not.
micro-level p
micro-level p
automatic data sharing
volitional data sharing

macro-level ➜
use is necessary

(1) CSLI

(2) using credit cards

macro-level ➜
use is discretionary

(3) Fitbit health
monitors

(4) voice-activated TVs

If the macro- and micro-involuntary arguments are necessary conditions to avoid the thirdparty doctrine, then only (1) CSLI remains protected under Katz. If the macro- and microinvoluntary arguments are separately sufﬁcient, then (1) CSLI, (2) credit cards, and (3) Fitbits all
remain Katz-protected. Given the potential sizes of categories (2) and (3), that is a huge difference.
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The Court didn’t say what it means189—and, indeed, it’s possible
the Court had neither alternative in mind. Perhaps the Court
intended only to make two arguments against voluntary sharing that
carry the day for this particular technology, remaining open to different antisharing arguments for other technologies. Although we
know that Carpenter didn’t voluntarily share his location data with
Sprint, we “do not know,” as Justice Gorsuch surely grew tired of
lamenting,190 just how doctrine has changed to make this so. As is
often the case when the Court marks out a new path, we await further
direction.
2. Protecting especially sensitive information. The Court could have
stopped right here: Miller-Smith does not apply because there was no
voluntary sharing, period. Instead, the Court injected data sensitivity
into the third-party equation. Actually, Chief Justice Roberts claimed
that the doctrine already considers sensitivity:
The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an individual
has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with
another. But the fact of “diminished privacy interests does not mean that
the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.” Riley [v California 191]. Smith and Miller, after all, did not rely solely on the act of sharing.
Instead, they considered “the nature of the particular documents sought”
to determine whether “there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’
concerning their contents.” Miller, 425 U.S., at 442.192

But this claim is forced, quoting non-third-party cases out of context.193 Rather, the Court has repeatedly explained that sharing in189

The locution “In the ﬁrst place, . . . Second, . . . As a result . . .” does not help. Id at 2220.

190

Id at 2266, 2267, 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
134 S Ct 2473, 2488 (2014).

191

192
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219 (majority). Some scholars agree that case law already
reﬂects, if only implicitly, some emphasis on information sensitivity. See, for example, Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize Third Party Data
After Carpenter, 53 Ga L Rev ∗14–16 (forthcoming 2019), archived at https://perma.cc
/6SYG-Q4TQ (referencing cases protecting communicative content, medical records, and
hotel rooms). Current law aside, some scholars believe sensitivity should be considered going
forward. See, for example, id at 24–25 (proposing new test should evaluate information on
“sensitivity continuum” reﬂecting mosaic approach); Kugler and Strahilevitz, 2015 Supreme
Court Review at 212 (cited in note 49) (advocating a Katz prong 1 focusing on general
expectations of privacy, and a Katz prong 2 focusing on the sensitivity of the collected information, both measured in part by survey research).
193
The quotation from Riley about “diminished” interests refers to arrestees rather than
third-party records. And the Court’s subsequent claim that Jones “already show[ed] special
solicitude for location information in the third-party context” is equally misplaced, as Jones is
likewise not a third-party records case. Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219.
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formation completely extinguishes rather than merely diminishes
privacy interests, as the dissenters pointed out194 (and as Roberts,
apparently inadvertently, recited elsewhere in his opinion195).
True, Miller looked at the “nature of the particular documents
sought,” but context shows it did so to determine whether the documents were shared with the bank, not whether they were especially sensitive.196 In Carpenter, Roberts noted Miller’s caution that
the “checks were ‘not conﬁdential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.’”197 But Miller’s
point was that all of the information shared with the bank was conveyed
to the bank itself, rather than kept “conﬁdential” from the bank but
conveyed to the bank so the bank could pass it along to another recipient (which apparently doesn’t count as third-party sharing with
the bank).198
The Court’s claim that Smith considered sensitivity also overreads
that decision. Smith did note the limited capabilities of a pen register,

194
See id at 2226, 2232 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (interpreting Miller-Smith as categorical
rule); id at 2262, 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (same).
195
“We have previously held that ‘a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.’ ” Id at 2216 (majority). That’s not a
novel characterization for the Chief Justice. See, for example, Georgia v Randolph, 547 US
103, 128 (2006) (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (“If an individual shares information, papers, or
places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that
information or those papers or places with the government”—note no mention of sensitivity
at all) (emphasis omitted).
196

Here is the full quotation:
[I]in Katz the Court also stressed that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” We must
examine the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected in order
to determine whether there is a legitimate “expectation of privacy” concerning
their contents.

Miller, 425 US at 442 (citation omitted).
197
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2216, quoting Miller, 425 US at 442.
198
See Miller, 425 US at 442 (“All of the documents obtained, including ﬁnancial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”).
Recall that Miller was applying Katz, where the caller was not held to convey the
content of his call to his phone company; rather, the company (like the postmaster for
letters) was merely an intermediary tasked with passing the conﬁdential communicative
content to Katz’s bookie. Miller just references, though distinguishes, the general rule that
communicative content shared with intermediaries whose function is to pass the content to
someone else (phone calls, letters, now e-mails) is not shared with the intermediaries in the
way that triggers third-party waiver. See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave et al, 2 Criminal
Procedure § 4.4(c) at 525 (West, 4th ed 2015).
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and telephone call logs reveal little in the way of “identifying information.”199 But again the Court’s language suggests that its point was
to distinguish Katz and to show that the information revealed in call
logs is information conveyed to the phone company, unlike communicative content for which the company is merely a transmitting
intermediary. And the Court then concluded that Smith’s privacy
interest in the noncontent information was extinguished, not because
it was nonsensitive, but because by making calls he “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”200
Of course, in Smith the Court did not state that the third-party
doctrine would apply to the caller’s substantive message had the
phone company created and stored a copy of that message after
forwarding it to the caller’s intended recipient. And while lower
courts’ subsequent decisions protecting various forms of communicative content typically invoke the just-described technical distinction between conveying to an intended recipient versus an intermediary,201 those decisions might well reﬂect a sense that the Court
would bend its brightly articulated line as necessary in order to
maintain Katz-based protection for highly sensitive information such
as personal communications. So perhaps lower courts’ sensitivity to
sensitivity quietly shaped the outer contours of Miller-Smith through
the years. But even if so, Chief Justice Roberts in Carpenter unabashedly and explicitly injected a sensitivity analysis for the ﬁrst time
into what used to be described as an inquiry focused solely on voluntary exposure. Both the doctrine (at least substantially) and its
articulation (quite clearly) have changed. As Justice Gorsuch put the
point, we now have “Katz-squared.”202
3. Miller-Smith revised: but how? How should courts square
Katz in the future? The Court in Carpenter said there are two separate rationales underlying the third-party doctrine—lack of special
sensitivity and voluntary exposure—and that CSLI triggers nei-

199

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219 (citation omitted).

200

Smith, 442 US at 744.
See, for example, United States v Warshak, 631 F3d 266, 288 (6th Cir 2010) (concluding
e-mail content is protected because internet service provider transmitting content is “an
intermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails”).
201

202

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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ther.203 As with its involuntary arguments, however, the Court does
not explain how the two rationales relate as part of the overall doctrine.
The Court might mean that the third-party doctrine applies when
either of the two rationales is present. In other words, if highly sensitive information was voluntarily conveyed (think Fitbit health data),
or if nonsensitive information was involuntarily shared (perhaps
computer internet protocol addresses?), then the privacy interest
dissipates. This reading ﬁts with the Court’s decision to address both
variables, rather than to end its analysis after ﬁnding no voluntary
sharing.
Or, the Court might mean that privacy dissipates only if both
rationales apply, and the information is both voluntarily shared and
nonsensitive. That seems perfectly logical too, though it seems less
likely because it would mean that the third-party doctrine can never
apply to sensitive information, no matter how clearly it was voluntarily shared (think of Carpenter posting his own location history on
Facebook, or celebrities publishing tell-all memoirs).
And then there is a third possibility, raised and criticized by the
dissents: an open-ended multifactor test. Justice Gorsuch, for example, lamented a “second Katz-like balancing inquiry, asking whether
the fact of disclosure . . . outweighs privacy interests in the ‘category
of information’ so disclosed.”204 Justice Kennedy also viewed the
Court as announcing a balancing test that encompassed both privacy
interests and CSLI tracking properties by “considering intimacy,
comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, and voluntariness.”205
Of course, the Court often articulates doctrine through multifactor
tests, but Justice Kennedy feared that this one would particularly put
“the law on a new and unstable foundation”206 as lower courts would
be left to ﬁgure out for themselves how the doctrinal variables relate
when they address other surveillance technologies and types of digital
data.

203

Id at 2219–20 (majority).

204

Id at 2267 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id at 2234 (Kennedy, J, dissenting); see id at 2231 (the Court “establish[es] a balancing
test” weighing “the privacy interests at stake” against “the fact that the information has been
disclosed”).
205

206

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2234 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
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As Professor Anthony Amsterdam sagely admonished just before
Miller-Smith emerged, scholarly critics should tread softly when the
Supreme Court ﬁrst steps onto an intuitively defensible but undertheorized new doctrinal path. Sometimes the Court recognizes that
“the application of clear and consistent [existing] theories would
produce unacceptable results” and a new direction is appropriate,
even though the Court is not prepared to announce the new doctrine
with the same level of speciﬁcity as the old doctrine, or to explain the
extent to which the new doctrine displaces or can be accommodated
with the old.207 I am sympathetic to the Court’s enterprise, even while
recognizing the many unsatisfying aspects of its explanations. Unlike
scholars, however, lower courts may not “take a sabbatical, or otherwise procrastinate till muddy waters clear”;208 they must now decide
how to pave this new path while awaiting further blueprints.
d. location monitoring exceptionalism—or dismantling
the third-party doctrine?
Privacy advocates hail Carpenter as heralding a broad Fourth
Amendment reformation for the digital age. By recognizing new
privacy interests and softening the third-party doctrine, they predict,
hopefully, that the new approach will eventually constrain other intrusive technologies and protect other types of personal records.209
The decision itself, however, admits no such thing. Indeed, the
Court’s opinion suggests the opposite—that perhaps its privacyprotecting analysis covers CSLI and little else. Given “the deeply
revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection,”210
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly claimed that long-term historical
location information is “unique,” “qualitatively different,” a “world of
difference” from Miller and Smith, and an “entirely different species”

207
208

Amsterdam, 58 Minn L Rev at 351, 352 (cited in note 12).
Id at 352.

209
See, for example, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Carpenter and the End of Bulk Surveillance
of Americans (LawFare, July 25, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/X6F6-75MP; Louise
Matsakis, The Supreme Court Just Greatly Strengthened Digital Privacy (Wired, June 22, 2008),
archived at https://perma.cc/UV9S-PK5X; Paul Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter v. United
States ( Just Security, June 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8LJQ-BN6B.
210

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2223.
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of business record.211 A search warrant will be required, he maintained, only in a “rare case.”212 As Roberts summarized the Court’s
holding:
Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters
not before us: real-time CSLI or “tower dumps” (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a
particular interval). We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller
or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as
security cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might
incidentally reveal location information. Further, our opinion does not
consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national
security. As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations
in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to
ensure that we do not “embarrass the future.”213

In truth, though, the Court’s underlying reasoning may not be so
easy to cabin to CSLI; and it is not at all clear that the Justices in the
majority would want to do so. Let’s consider how stable and deeply
rooted the Court’s proposed or suggested distinctions might be.
1. Other forms of direct location monitoring. The Court’s reasoning sends this clear message: government’s use in domestic criminal
investigations of tracking technologies that reveal a target’s relatively
precise historical locations over an extended period of time now
triggers a Fourth Amendment search. This includes CSLI data, GPS
tracking, and future equivalents, whether the technology tracks the
target personally214 or through her phones,215 cars,216 or anything else
211

Id at 2217, 2216, 2219, 2222.

212

Id at 2222.

213

Id at 2220 (citation omitted). This caution rests in substantial tension with the Court’s
aggressiveness in describing CSLI as approaching GPS-level tracking. See Part II.A.
214
For example, law enforcement agencies increasingly use various technologies to track
individuals directly, including aerial surveillance drones and body cameras linked with facial
recognition software. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 Emory L J 527, 539–44 (2017)
(video cameras and drones); id at 547 (body cameras).
215
I use my cell phone for driving directions, ﬁnding coffee shops and gas stations, and
sometimes (shh, don’t tell them) tracking my teen daughters; all of these functions share my
or another phone’s GPS coordinates with a third party.
216
For example, ﬁxed-place license plate readers or intersection cameras can identify and
record car trafﬁc. Levinson-Waldman, 66 Emory L J at 544–47 (cited in note 214) (noting
ICE use of license plate readers). And smart boxes and dashboard infotainment services installed in cars can transmit information about car location and operation to manufacturers
and other third parties. Michael J. D. Vermeer, Dulani Woods, and Brian A. Jackson,
Identifying Law Enforcement Needs for Access to Digital Evidence in Remote Data Centers ∗22
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that frequently accompanies her as she moves;217 and this conclusion
surely governs government-initiated monitoring as well as accessing
third-party location records. (As explained earlier, I suspect the Court
will maintain at least some durational trigger, excluding short-term
monitoring from Fourth Amendment coverage.)218
The Court’s insistence that it does not “call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,”
raises interesting questions.219 I assume “conventional” techniques
include old-fashioned eyes-on personalized surveillance of the sort
Justice Alito compared to GPS tracking in his Jones concurrence,
potentially involving “a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and
perhaps aerial assistance.”220 At ﬁrst glance, it would seem that such
conventional, personalized surveillance should be subject to the same
durational limits as more high-tech location monitoring. After all,
around-the-clock personal surveillance reveals at least the same “privacies of life” and is “reasonably unexpected” to the same degree.221 So
(Rand, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7ANK-TB3Z (noting that “Carfax, Hertz, and
other vehicle-related companies collect vehicle histories, including oil changes, vehicle locations, and potentially even snapshots from an in-car camera that could have evidentiary
utility”).
217
For example, Fitbits and other body-worn biometric assessment devices generally track
movement and location, among other things. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth
Amendment, 102 Cornell L Rev 547, 558–59 (2017).
218
See text accompanying note 165. Because the Court assumed (contra the record) that
CSLI reveals the user’s location pretty much continuously, the Court had no need to consider whether it might have felt differently about a week’s worth of records if each day
produced signiﬁcantly fewer data points. If a different tracking technology ﬁxed the target’s
location just once per hour or once per day, perhaps the Court would recognize that only a
longer period of location monitoring would pose a sufﬁcient mosaic-based privacy risk to
constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
219
As noted above, I assume that even “conventional tools” such as security cameras no
longer qualify as “conventional surveillance techniques” once their videos or photos are aggregated into a long-term database that is searchable through facial recognition technology so
as to constitute a form of historical location tracking. The distinction is less clear for long-term
surveillance through an around-the-clock video camera feed targeting suspects’ homes.
Compare, for example, United States v Houston, 813 F3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir 2016) (holding
that 24/7 video monitoring of suspect’s home for ten-week period was not a Fourth Amendment search), with State v Jones, 903 NW2d 101, 113 (SD 2017) (holding that similar video
monitoring for eight-week period was a search); see also United States v Kubasiak, 2018 WL
4846761, ∗6–7 (ED Wis) (holding that Carpenter’s reasoning does not apply to four-month and
24/7 video camera surveillance of defendant’s backyard).
220

Jones, 565 US at 429 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment).
See Slobogin, 8 Duke J Const’l L & Pub Pol at 27 (cited in note 48) (recognizing that
naked-eye “[o]vert surveillance by the police can be just as intrusive as covert tracking or
monitoring”). These conclusions apply as well to private surveillance, for example where a
private detective is hired to conﬁrm a spouse is cheating or unﬁt to parent.
221
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if a week-long CSLI request (or shorter, if the Court later shrinks the
duration trigger for a search) violates Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy, why not also a same-length old-school stakeout and
tail, or a same-length use of low-tech tools such as ﬁxed-position security and trafﬁc cameras?
But the Court’s refusal to question conventional or low-tech surveillance is no surprise. Calling old-school tailing a search would
signiﬁcantly hamper what heretofore has been universally considered
good investigative policing. And there is no sign that the Court
intended that, as evidenced by its repeated references to CSLI
tracking being “unique.” What explains this?
Perhaps this again reﬂects a regulatory rather than atomistic bent,
given how much the Court emphasized CSLI’s detailed, comprehensive, infallible, cheap, and retrospective nature. It is hard to see why
these features make high-tech surveillance categorically more privacyrevealing from the target’s atomistic perspective. First, good old-school
surveillance might be just as detailed and comprehensive—and potentially more so, because it can reveal not just the target’s location but
also how she appears, what she’s doing, and with whom. Second, while
CSLI is nearly infallible, good traditional surveillance might produce
records that are not far off, especially if cameras are used and observations are meticulously documented. And, in any event, the Court has
previously rejected the normatively dubious proposition that targets
can expect privacy due to witnesses’ faulty recall.222 Third, the fact that
CSLI tracking is relatively cheap doesn’t add to a target’s privacy intrusion for a comparably long surveillance. Finally, the fact that CSLI
records can effectively turn back time is similarly atomistically irrelevant, as there is no reason to think that the target’s activities for some
week in the past are categorically more revealing than for some week in
the present. Overall, it’s hard to see why the target’s atomistic privacy
expectation in the whole of her public movements for any particular
span of time turns on whether the government uses high-tech or lowtech location-monitoring measures.
That said, these features plus more may lead government to track
more people using CSLI than it would track using only traditional
222
See, for example, Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 439 (1963) (admitting in evidence
undercover agent’s electronic recording of conversation because defendant has no “constitutional right to rely on possible ﬂaws in the agent’s memory” and assumes risk that witness’s
testimony will be “accurately reproduced in court”); Smith, 442 US at 744 –45 (explaining
that shift from human operator to automated switchboard does not affect privacy analysis).
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measures, such that a CSLI tracking regime might be more privacyintrusive in the aggregate, even if not so for individual targets. Though
not as hassle-free as some suggest,223 seeking CLSI from Sprint
avoids typical hurdles to setting up a successful stakeout and tail. First
and foremost, it is far less costly for the government. Traditional
surveillance efforts typically require money, manpower, and equipment; generally, the longer the effort, the higher the cost. Resource
constraints limit how much around-the-clock surveillance law enforcement can handle, forcing ofﬁcials to prioritize and to intensively
track only relatively important targets. Comparatively costless access
to CSLI records will likely lead government to monitor the movements of many more suspects for less signiﬁcant crimes. Second,
CSLI tracking avoids any risk of community pushback for establishing longer-term eyes-on surveillance operations that might inconvenience or otherwise irritate neighboring residents or workers.224 Third, CSLI data can locate as well as follow a target if her cell
phone number is known, whereas traditional surveillance works only
if agents already know where the target can be found so they can start
the tail. For these reasons, agents might employ high-tech tracking
even though they would not otherwise choose to bear the costs of
low-tech alternatives—especially where, by hypothesis, they do not
yet have probable cause to support their intuitions.225 Finally, CSLI is
more user-friendly in a different way: being able to discover a target’s
past rather than only her present/future locations enables agents to
focus on the time frame that best ﬁts their investigatory goals and to
access information that is “otherwise unknowable.”226 Therefore, the
Court could reasonably worry that the capacity for high-tech track223
Compare Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218 (“with just the click of a button”), with Vermeer,
Woods, and Jackson, Identifying Law Enforcement Needs (cited in note 216) (canvassing difﬁculties law enforcement faces in securing digital data from third-party service providers). It
also costs something for ofﬁcials to decipher the data, with experts mapping towers onto real
locations.
224
See Jones, 565 US at 416 (Sotomayor, J, concurring) (explaining that, because GPS
monitoring is cheap and “proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive police practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility ’ ”) (citation
omitted).
225
Using surveillance cameras might also cost little at the margin, if the costs of installing
and maintaining the cameras are borne by others as with private store security cameras; or if
the government uses cameras that it previously mounted on utility poles or over trafﬁc lights,
etc.
226
As noted earlier, see text accompanying notes 157–58, it will likely be comparatively
difﬁcult and costly to reconstruct the target’s past movements through nosy neighbors’
eyewitness testimony.
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ing will encourage ofﬁcials to do it more often and hence acquire far
more sensitive location information about people in the aggregate,
even if the extent of any given intrusion is the same.
This explanation ﬁts the Court’s expressed desire “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”227 While
the Court focused primarily on CSLI’s capacity for individual-target
intrusion, at key points the opinion also suggested concern for the
overall ﬂow of information to the government. For example, as Chief
Justice Roberts noted, “[t]he Government’s position fails to contend
with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the
tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not
for a short period but for years and years.”228 One can almost hear a
background whisper of “Big Brother” throughout the analysis, as
well as in Justice Sotomayor’s earlier warning in Jones about government gathering intimate information “more or less at will.”229
Concerns over frequency do not typically play a role in determining whether an investigatory method constitutes an atomistically
intrusive search. But, in the end, I suspect such concerns are driving
much of the distinction here between high- and low-tech surveillance
methods for those Justices who worry that the former “may ‘alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical
to democratic society.’”230 If so, this doctrinal line will likely remain
stable over time.231
2. Other types of sensitive third-party records. The Court also
purported in Carpenter neither to “disturb the application of Smith
and Miller” nor to “address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information,” let alone to address records
that reveal nonlocation information.232 The Smith-Miller category
227

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214 (citation omitted)

228

Id at 2219.
Jones, 565 US at 416 (Sotomayor, J, concurring); id (questioning the “appropriateness of
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool
so amenable to misuse”).
230
Id (citation omitted).
229

231
And this might provide a reason to treat “tower dumps,” a “download of information on
all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval,” differently
from short-term historical or real-time tracking of a single target. Carpenter, 138 S Ct at
2220. While the intrusion per individual is the same, the aggregate information grab by the
government is vastly greater for tower dumps.
232
Id. As Carpenter did not move to suppress the information contained in his carriers’
records showing the phone numbers he dialed, he presented no direct challenge to Smith.

458

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2018

obviously includes sensitive ﬁnancial and call-record information; the
second category includes such things as credit card swipes, ATM
withdrawals, and computer wi-ﬁ connections through IP addresses;
and the third category includes such things as accountant, utility,
medical, and internet-of-things records.233 The dissenters rightly
pressed back by asking why location information is more sensitive
and deserving of Fourth Amendment protection than, say, credit card
or phone records.234 After all, many private facts can be inferred from
these other types of records as well.
In response, Chief Justice Roberts did not address the comparison
between location and phone call, ﬁnancial, or other information in
the abstract. Instead, he purported to distinguish Miller and Smith by
emphasizing the quantity as well as the quality of the CSLI at stake.
Rather than information about “a person’s movement at a particular
time,” this case is “about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical
presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years” and
thus “implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in
Smith and Miller.”235
But that compares a truckload of apples to a handful of oranges.
The proper question, one would think, is whether a week of location
monitoring works a qualitatively greater privacy intrusion than a
week of phone call records or credit card purchases.236 As to that
comparison, the dissenters either were agnostic237 or thought quite
the opposite.238 Reasonable people clearly can reasonably disagree.239
233
While many of these examples reveal information linked to ﬁxed locations (e.g., inperson bank transactions, landline phones, home-based utility or appliance usage, in-person
doctor visits), the location sensitivity is typically dwarfed by other privacy concerns.
234
235

Id at 2224, 2229, 2232–33 (Kennedy, J, dissenting); id at 2267 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
Id at 2220 (majority).

236
I’m accepting here the Court’s focus on number of days as the proper metric, but perhaps
one ought to compare X number of location data points with X number of phone calls or X
number of purchases, whether they take the same or different time periods to generate.
237
“Why is someone’s location when using a phone so much more sensitive than who he was
talking to (Smith) or what ﬁnancial transactions he engaged in (Miller)? I do not know. . . .”
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
238
Because who you call and what you buy can reveal so much about what you do and with
whom, “[t]he troves of intimate information the Government can and does obtain using ﬁnancial records and telephone records dwarfs what can be gathered from cell-site records.” Id
at 2232 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
239
Surveys show people are sensitive about location information as well as many other
kinds of surveillance and third-party records, with some ranking their various sensitivities
quite differently than do others. See, for example, Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The
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And if Justice Kennedy is correct that the Court intends CSLI’s
operative properties of “comprehensiveness, expense, [and] retrospectivity” to weigh in the balance, those too are a wash. Whether the
government seeks CSLI records or call, banking, or credit card
records, it is just requesting similarly stored information from a different record-holder. For each category of information, ofﬁcials can
collect all stored records fairly effortlessly, going far back in time.240
In the end, while location information is surely different from other
kinds of information, whether it is categorically more sensitive reﬂects
a multifaceted subjective judgment.241 And there is still the question
of how sensitive information must be to trigger Fourth Amendment
protection. Is protection limited to mosaic-creating information,
meaning the records reveal something (how much is unclear) about
someone’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations? Or should protection be triggered for highly sensitive
information that offers little mosaic-creating potential, such as records of third-party DNA testing revealing someone’s ancestry composition and a genetic proclivity for adult-onset vision loss?242
A close friend and brilliant lawyer undoubtedly spoke for many
when he summarized the Court’s reasoning as follows: historical
location monitoring “feels kind of invasive to me, so it must be subject
to the 4th Amendment.” Put differently, short of deﬁning a search by
social survey data (which would raise conceptual and methodological
quandaries),243 the Court’s Katz-based approach in Carpenter, in the
New Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment 183–85 (Chicago, 2007) (survey
results ranking sensitivity over twenty types of transactional records); Kugler and Strahilevitz,
2015 Supreme Court Review at 239 (cited in note 49) (“Contemporary polling on sensitivity
produces a hierarchy that many readers will ﬁnd intuitive . . . [but] some readers may prefer to
construct the hierarchy differently than the median citizen does”).
240
The comparison between CSLI and call records is particularly salient, since Sprint
keeps these types of information in the exact same records and therefore one is no more
comprehensive, cheap, and historical (or infallible, for that matter) than the other.
241
See Kugler and Strahilevitz, 2015 Supreme Court Review at 237 (cited in note 49)
(“Determining what information counts as sensitive requires numerous subjective judgments.
Sensitivity depends a great deal on context, on the identity of the recipient of the information, on the preferences of the data privacy subject, the risks posed by present or future
disclosure, and the priors of the person evaluating the information.”).
242
Consider Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (musing that, despite the
apparent applicability of Miller-Smith, the notion that agents can “secure your DNA from
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause . . . strikes most lawyers and judges today—me
included—as pretty unlikely”).
243
See, for example, Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized
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words of Justice Gorsuch, inevitably entails some intuitive judgment
based on “I do not know [what] and the Court does not say.”244
Is the Court serious about hewing to its articulated line and ensuring that exceptions to the Miller-Smith doctrine will be “rare”?
Only time will tell. But there is no question the line will be tested
early and often. In addition to privacy advocates, every criminal defendant whose investigation includes any third-party record request,
or any more than de minimis surveillance, will surely press the claim.
And lower courts now can listen. While they were previously bound
mechanically to apply both the Knotts and Miller-Smith exposure
rules, the amorphous nature of the Court’s new doctrinal tests now
gives judges license, if not permission, to deviate, to innovate, and
even to anticipate technological change.
Perhaps that is precisely what the majority intended. The Court
could have buttressed its cautionary prose by resting its conclusion on
far narrower grounds, deploying reasoning less likely to invite openended interpretation than its mosaic approach coupled with sensitivity considerations.245 But by embracing a broader if more uncertain
approach, the majority can beneﬁt from unleashed lower-court efforts to help map Carpenter’s new doctrinal paths. While the doctrine
remains unsettled, law enforcement ofﬁcers will likely err on the side
of securing search warrants. And where they cannot or do not get
warrants, the ofﬁcers’ reasonable mistakes (viewed in hindsight, if
and Permitted by Society,” 42 Duke L J 727 (1993) (empirically testing how people rate different
searches’ intrusiveness); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya, and Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple
Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U Pa J Const L 331 (2009) (updating
and modifying survey methodology and analysis).
244
245

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).

The Court could have distinguished Knotts by embracing a private space–protective
prophylactic rule based on United States v Karo, 468 US 705 (1984), see note 164; or distinguished Miller-Smith just by its micro-involuntary argument (automated connectivity rather
than volitionally triggered sharing) and stopped there, see text accompanying note 192.
Or here is a third narrow path: the Court could have held that Carpenter did not actually share
(voluntarily or otherwise) the information extracted from Sprint’s records because he didn’t know
the speciﬁc towers/sectors his phone signaled when in use. To be sure, sometimes we are deemed
(under current doctrine) to share information that we don’t actively know in the sense of being
consciously aware of it in the moment; for example, when we swipe a credit card at a gas station and
we functionally transmit the store’s address to American Express even though we don’t really
know that address, or we hit “call back” or “Mom’s ofﬁce” on our smartphones and functionally
transmit the corresponding call numbers even though we don’t currently remember them. See In
re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F3d 600, 613 (5th Cir 2013). But in those and
similar contexts, we know we can easily ﬁnd out the content of the data we are transmitting. Here,
by contrast, Carpenter could not realistically have known or learned the speciﬁc towers/sectors his
phone signaled when in use because of the way cell service works. See note 26 and accompanying
text.
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and when Carpenter’s coverage expands) will be excused under the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. From the Court’s
perspective, what’s not to like?246
III. Get a Warrant
After all that, had the Court concluded that the warrantless
search of Sprint’s CSLI records was not “unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment, perhaps its uncertain narrowing of Katz’s carveouts for public or third-party exposure would be much ado about
nothing. The Court could have found the search justiﬁed because the
government satisﬁed the mid-level “reasonable suspicion” standard,
or the lower-level standard for compulsory document production, or
even the SCA’s own requirement of “speciﬁc and articulable facts
showing reasonable grounds to believe” that the records were “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”247 But the
Court conﬁdently announced that “the Government’s obligation” to
justify this search “is a familiar one—get a warrant.”248 Although this
conclusion might be familiar, in this context it is far from axiomatic.
Indeed, the Court might proﬁtably have refrained from addressing
this issue at all, instead remanding for further lower-court consideration. Although a Fourth Amendment search typically triggers a
warrant requirement, it does not always do so; and critics of the thirdparty doctrine have taken different positions on the issue.249 Lower
courts through the years have paid much less attention to the justiﬁcation than to the search question.250 And, in particular, few courts
246
And of course, while courts debate and reﬁne the new mosaic approach and narrowed
third-party doctrine, other actors may explore their own interventions. Congress, state
legislatures, and state courts may create positive law protections for privacy interests in thirdparty records that would overlay any Fourth Amendment protection (or, under the alternative property-based approach Justice Gorsuch tentatively advanced, that would themselves
create new property interests deserving Fourth Amendment protection, see text accompanying notes 109–12). And perhaps service providers seeking to assuage old customers and
woo new ones will consider storing far fewer name-identiﬁed records for far fewer days,
limiting the information a search would reveal.
247

See discussion in Parts III.B and III.C.
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221. The Court acknowledged that case-speciﬁc exceptions may
support warrantless searches in conventionally recognized exigent circumstances, such as
“pursu[ing] a ﬂeeing suspect, protect[ing] individuals who are threatened with imminent
harm, or prevent[ing] the imminent destruction of evidence.” Id at 2222–23.
248

249
250

See note 276 and accompanying text.

For most courts (including the Sixth Circuit here) the second question became moot
after ﬁnding there was no Fourth Amendment search to justify.
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have meaningfully considered the dissents’ primary argument (discussed below) that the traditional standard governing subpoenas duces
decum should apply.251 Despite professing caution when deciding the
search question, the Court appeared decidedly uninterested in what
lower courts, or even Congress, might have to say about Fourth
Amendment reasonableness after they consider the Court’s new view
of the privacy interests at stake.252
Although the warrant requirement typically follows a newly deﬁned
search, the connection here is worth a closer look for two reasons. First,
for Justices who care (and surely some do), the trade-off between privacy protection and law enforcement interests may undergird the desire to keep “[o]ur decision today . . . a narrow one.” Requiring probable
cause for long-term CSLI tracking will, unsurprisingly, hinder and
sometimes thwart investigations into various crimes. Applying the same
requirement to single-data-point or very short-term tracking (historical or prospective) will expand and amplify the burden while protecting,
by deﬁnition, thinner mosaic-based privacy interests. And applying the
same requirement to a much broader swath of third-party records will
magnify those costs considerably, as law enforcement is far more dependent on early-investigation access to certain other records for certain types of crimes. Obviously, the privacy/enforcement trade-off has
no formal place within the Court’s search analysis. But as a matter of
simple prediction, I suspect the Court will be reluctant to extend Carpenter’s new search deﬁnition to encompass short-term location tracking or ﬁnancial, phone, and other forms of communications metadata
if the warrant requirement would inevitably apply.
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s response to the dissents’ pressure
to apply the much more relaxed reasonableness standard traditionally
governing subpoena-compelled production of documents may have
implications well beyond this case. While articulating a new sensi-

251
252

None of the ﬁve Court of Appeals decisions did so. See note 30.

Lower courts might have looked to experience from the nine states that by statute or
constitutional provision currently require warrants to obtain CSLI. See Carpenter Petr’s Brief
at ∗22 & n 11 (cited in note 113).
And prompted by the Court’s holding that a search occurred, perhaps Congress would
have amended the Stored Communications Act to require a showing greater than investigatory relevance but still short of probable cause, a decision potentially deserving deference down the road. See United States v Di Re, 332 US 581, 585 (1948) (noting Court
has “be[en] reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable”); Jones, 565 US at 429–30 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment) (suggesting
preference for legislative resolution).
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tivity constraint on third-party subpoenas to protect Carpenter’s
CSLI, the Court (perhaps inadvertently) raised questions as to
whether and how that same constraint may apply to a broad array of
ﬁrst-party subpoenas as well.
a. the warrant requirement and early-stage
criminal investigations
Police use CSLI tracking because it works; and not just to solve
store thefts.253 “Historical cell tower location records are routinely
used to investigate the full gamut of state and federal crimes, including child abductions, bombings, kidnappings, murders, robberies, sex offenses, and terrorism-related offenses.”254 For example,
historical CSLI was recently used to identify the person alleged to
have mailed pipe bombs to various Democratic ofﬁcials and supporters and CNN.255
Surely, at times police have used SCA court orders to secure historical CSLI even where they had sufﬁcient probable cause to secure
a warrant.256 But CSLI is generally requested during the early stages
of criminal investigations, when police lack probable cause with respect to any given suspect.257 Many lower courts have described the
government’s use of location data in solving serious crimes where the
stories make clear the data were very helpful long before ofﬁcials
could establish probable cause.258 Early access to location information
is particularly useful to determine who among several potential
253
Those who have characterized Carpenter’s spree of cell phone robberies as relatively
mundane might be forgetting or at least underappreciating the gang’s frequent use of a gun.
254

United States v Davis, 785 F3d 498, 518 (11th Cir 2015) (en banc) (citing cases).

255

After federal agents identiﬁed a possible suspect, they used his historical CSLI records
to conﬁrm he had signaled a cell tower in the vicinity of the post ofﬁce used to mail some of
the packages (and then they apparently used real-time cell-tower tracking to locate and arrest
him). Kara Scannell, Evan Perez, and Shimon Prokupecz, How the Alleged Bomber Was Caught
(CNN, Oct 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6Y56-GHWL.
256
Some commentators assert that was true for Carpenter. See Lior Strahilevitz and Matthew Tokson, Quick Reactions to Today’s Carpenter Oral Argument―Post 2 (Concurring
Opinions, Nov 29, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/A85G-M7K3 (“There probably was
probable cause in Smith v. Maryland, and in Carpenter, for that matter.”). I’m dubious as to
the latter, especially given the breadth of the records request.
257
Davis, 785 F3d at 518; see also id (“In such cases, [SCA] § 2703(d) orders—like other
forms of compulsory process not subject to the search warrant procedure—help to build
probable cause against the guilty, deﬂect suspicion from the innocent, aid in the search for
truth, and judiciously allocate scarce investigative resources.”).
258
See, for example, United States v Pembrook, 876 F3d 812, 816–19 (6th Cir 2017) (using
CSLI initially to identify common phones near two jewelry heists that were over 150 miles
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suspects deserves further scrutiny,259 to exclude potential suspects
where a wrong accusation might stymie the investigation or cause
other harms,260 and to identify members and signiﬁcant places (e.g.,
for meetings, hideouts, and stashes) for criminal groups such as
gangs, mobs, and other conspiracies.261
Some privacy advocates assert that a warrant requirement will have
little impact on criminal investigations, claiming that ofﬁcials can
almost always establish probable cause if they just work a little
harder.262 That strikes me as quite optimistic, as more sober privacy
experts concede.263 More likely, sometimes additional sleuthing will
produce probable cause to support a warrant for CSLI records; and
sometimes it will not, leaving the records unobtainable.264
apart and ﬁnding a recently activated prepaid “burner” phone with no associated name; call
detail records then identiﬁed the perpetrators).
259
See, for example, United States v Reynolds, 626 Fed Appx 610, 612 (6th Cir 2015)
(identifying one among several plausible suspects because only he was in the vicinity of the
house where and when a computer downloaded child pornography).
260
For example, quietly ruling out a father or boyfriend as a child kidnapping suspect
because CSLI shows he was not near the abduction scene, where a false accusation or even
just further investigation might both preclude his good-faith assistance and create a longterm family rift. See Davis, 785 F3d at 518 (noting that CSLI can reveal that “an individual
suspect was . . . far away in another city or state”).
261
See Jim Baker, recorded in The Lawfare Podcast: Jim Baker and Orin Kerr on the Carpenter
Ruling (Lawfare, June 30, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8P4G-RH2U.
262
Aziz Huq, The Latest Supreme Court Decision Is Being Hailed as a Big Victory for Digital
Privacy. It’s Not (Vox, June 23, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/R895-XL9N (explaining
that CSLI data are “routinely relevant to conspiracy charges” and asserting that in such cases
“it will often be very easy for the police to meet the (exceedingly weak) probable cause
standard”); see also Davis, 785 F3d at 543 (Martin dissenting) (“But if my view of the Fourth
Amendment were to prevail, all the ofﬁcers in this case had to do was get a warrant for this
search. That is no great burden.”).
263
As Jane Bambauer advises, “[m]ost [privacy] scholars know that recognizing access to thirdparty records as a full-ﬂedged search requiring a warrant and probable cause is an unworkable
solution. Police need some way to build up suspicion about a suspect, and keeping every last thirdparty record off limits until the case progresses to probable cause would unacceptably frustrate
investigations.” Bambauer, 94 Tex L Rev at 215 (cited in note 170); id at 216–17 (“If courts open
the deﬁnition of ‘search’ to cover more things, they must have the latitude to work exclusively
within the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment and to avoid the Warrant Clause.”).
264
Two potential unintended consequences are worth noting. First, where agents do the
extra work and manage to develop probable cause to support a CSLI records request, might
the agents then consider broadening the scope of their intended search? Armed with probable
cause, why not also seek even more precise GPS data created by location or drivingdirections apps? Or also seek the content of text messages or e-mails sent or received within a
few days of the crime? Once agents have probable cause to believe location records would
reveal evidence of criminality, they likely also have probable cause to believe GPS data and
text and e-mail content would do so as well.
Second, many conventional sleuthing efforts are prone to error and stereotyping, and
they tend to disproportionately focus on poor and minorities communities―tendencies
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Expanding Carpenter’s search deﬁnition to include single-datapoint or very short-term CSLI monitoring would not only protect
records less susceptible to privacy-threatening mosaic creation,265 but
also make it harder for police to use CSLI precisely when it offers the
most unique investigative beneﬁts, such as checking to see whether a
phone was near a single relevant place at a single relevant time.266 In
other words, the privacy/law enforcement trade-off is quite sensitive
to monitoring duration.
That said, it is worth noting that although both long- and shortterm CSLI records requests are useful for investigating many different types of crime, they are not crucial for investigating any particular type of crime. So the inevitable costs to law enforcement will
likely be distributed across many different kinds of criminal investigations. And, of course, access to location records for use in criminal
investigations is relatively new.
By contrast, the impediment to effective and efﬁcient investigations would likely both be more widespread and have a greater impact
on particular crimes if the Supreme Court or lower courts broaden
Carpenter’s “narrow” ruling to hold that securing other types of thirdparty records likewise requires a warrant. Many other types of thirdparty records (especially ﬁnancial, credit card purchases, internet
protocol addresses, and phone/text noncontent metadata) are routinely relied upon in early-stage investigations.267 And certain types of
crimes would largely defy successful prosecution without early access
to such third-party records. Obvious examples include white-collar
ﬁnancial crimes, identity theft, “[m]alicious hacking, possession of
child pornography, laundering money through gambling websites,
and insider trading,” which among other crimes “leave very few clues
in the physical world.”268 And proactive efforts to identify and thwart
that digital records generally avoid. See Bambauer, 94 Tex L Rev at 244–48 (cited in note
170); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163
U Penn L Rev 327, 391 (2015) (“The accuracy that big data provides not only increases
the likelihood that police target the right suspects, but also, in turn, prevents the resulting
physical, face-to-face interactions [of conventional policing] that generate tension.”).
265

See note 161 and accompanying text.

266

See notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2229 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (referencing crimes ranging
from drug trafﬁcking to health-care fraud to tax evasion).
267

268
Bambauer, 94 Tex L Rev at 249 (cited in note 170); id (“Some crimes offer little hope of
detection without the aid of third-party data.”); Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 Miss L J 139, 185–86 (2005) (explaining that “requiring a uniform
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potential acts of terrorism require lots of background location and
movement data from which computer algorithms can predict conventional behavior in order to discern unconventional and perhaps
threatening aberrations.269
The ultimate impediments to law enforcement efforts posed by
requiring a warrant to access CSLI and other third-party records
cannot easily be quantiﬁed, though surely they are real. The Court
has previously voiced concern over these impediments when protecting grand juries’ long-standing authority to compel access to documentary evidence in order to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe a crime was committed; requiring a warrant up front
“would stop much if not all investigation in the public interest at the
threshold of inquiry.”270 Justice Alito echoed this concern in Carpenter,
warning that requiring search warrants for document production
requests “will seriously damage, if not destroy, their utility.”271
Perhaps that alarm is a bit dramatic. But whatever impact Carpenter’s warrant requirement will have on criminal investigations
where early-stage CSLI data could be useful, the impact of further
extending Carpenter’s search analysis to protect short-term CSLI and
especially other third-party records—assuming the warrant requirement comes along for the ride—will be broader and sharper. That
recognition at least invites a closer look at the warrant requirement’s
plausible alternatives, if only for future consideration.
b. why not impose a mid-level reasonableness standard?
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, not
warrantless ones. The United States argued that the SCA’s “reasonable grounds to believe . . . relevant” standard, perhaps somewhat
standard of probable cause for all [third-party] records searches . . . provides far too much
protection for some types of information” because certain kinds of investigations “would
probably never get off the ground”); Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 4.13 at 1081 (West, 5th ed 2012) (noting IRS subpoena power “is critical
to determining tax liability properly”).
269
See Baker, Jim Baker and Orin Kerr on the Carpenter Ruling (cited in note 261).
270
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v Walling, 327 US 186, 213 (1946); see also, for example, United
States v R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 US 292, 297 (1991) (“[T]he government cannot be required to
justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting evidence sufﬁcient to establish
probable cause because the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain whether
probable cause exists.”).
271
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2256 (Alito, J, dissenting); see id at 2257 (Alito, J, dissenting)
(“Today a skeptical majority decides to put that understanding to the test.”).
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less stringent than the more commonplace “reasonable suspicion”
standard, is a more appropriate measure of constitutional reasonableness for CSLI searches than is probable cause.272 The Court has
previously signaled that a subprobable-cause standard sufﬁces in exceptional circumstances involving “special law enforcement needs,
diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like.”273
The United States claimed that cell phone users’ privacy interests are
at least somewhat diminished, the document request to a third party
visits only “minimal intrusions” upon the target, and law enforcement’s heavy reliance on early-stage access to records before it can
establish probable cause presents a special need. And over the past
few decades, the Supreme Court has been increasingly receptive to
nonwarrant reasonableness determinations.274
But the Carpenter Court wasted no words―literally zero―rejecting this argument. Presumably the Court, having described CSLI
tracking as uniquely invasive and involuntary, simply rejected the
premise of “diminished” expectations and “minimal” intrusions.275
Carpenter US Brief at ∗50–55 (cited in note 126).
Maryland v King, 569 US 435, 447 (2013), citing Illinois v McArthur, 531 US 326, 330
(2001); see Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473, 2484 (2014) (“Absent more precise guidance
from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from
the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon
an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests.’ ”), citing Wyoming v Houghton, 526 US 295, 300 (1999);
United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 561 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment imposes
no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.”) (citation omitted).
274
See, for example, Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution 222–27
(Oxford, 2000) (canvassing Rehnquist Court decisions upholding warrantless searches in
various contexts).
272
273

275
Perhaps the Court found the warrant requirement additionally attractive for ensuring
that the decision to invade privacy is made by a judge. But if the Court required only reasonable suspicion or some other intermediate standard to CSLI requests, agents would still
need to seek a court order to comply with the SCA.
For other third-party records requests, the traditional subpoena process might frequently lead to judicial preclearance. Many statutes (including the SCA) either require or
permit under many circumstances third parties served with a subpoena seeking customer
information to notify the customer. See Ellen S. Podgor et al, White Collar Crime § 17.5
at 576 (West, 2d ed 2018). When a customer receives notice, she can move in court to
quash the subpoena―formerly on grounds of overbreadth, harassment, and the like; but
after Carpenter presumably to protect her own reasonable expectation of privacy. Id § 16.9
(D) at 514–15; id § 16.12(G) at 563.
And where the ﬁrst-party target does not receive such notice, the third-party recordholder can move to quash the subpoena itself, perhaps increasingly motivated by marketplace pressures to protect consumer conﬁdentiality. Conventional Fourth Amendment
standing rules appear to preclude the company from raising the target’s claim as well as its
own. Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 133–34 (1978). Perhaps in this atypical context, how-
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That was predictable here. But if the search holding ultimately
extends to other types of third-party records, then the same question
will arise there. After emphatically requiring a warrant here, the
Court may feel compelled to apply the same rule for all other thirdparty record searches, even though there might be a more persuasive
argument for diminished expectations (due to some measure of voluntariness) and minimal intrusions (due to lesser sensitivity) in other
contexts. And many privacy scholars critical of Miller-Smith’s reach
have advocated reasonable suspicion or some other intermediary or
graduated standard rather than across-the-board probable cause as
properly balancing the competing privacy and law enforcement
interests.276 The Court could have been more cautious, reserving
some ﬂexibility for itself and lower courts facing challenges to other
record requests, by conceding room for nuance. But the Court’s selfdescribed caution in keeping its search holding narrow found no
visible expression here.
Of course, there is another plausible explanation. As described
above, a broadly applied warrant requirement for third-party record
requests likely would signiﬁcantly hamper many criminal investigations, especially for particular crimes such as child pornography,
tax fraud, ﬁnancial crimes, internet hacking, and the like. Perhaps
the Supreme Court wants the apparent remedial consequences to
discourage lower courts (and its future self) from expanding its
Fourth Amendment search ﬁnding beyond what it portrays as continuous, precise, and long-term location monitoring. Put differently,
if it might be difﬁcult to ﬁnd principled ways to cabin the Court’s
ever, Sprint should have third-party standing to champion the rights of a customer who
receives no advance notice of the search, and indeed will never learn about it unless she is
ultimately prosecuted based on its fruits. But see Microsoft Corp. v United States Dep’t of
Justice, 233 F Supp 3d 887, 912 (WD Wash 2017) (denying service provider third-party
standing to represent non-noticed customers’ Fourth Amendment interests).
276
See, for example, Slobogin, 75 Miss L J at 169 (cited in note 268) (matching different
types of records with either a probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or relevance requirement); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party
Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 Pepperdine L Rev 975, 1025 (2007) (after
canvassing nine relevant factors, advocating “ﬂexible reasonableness criterion that considers
the totality of the circumstances”). See also Bambauer, 94 Tex L Rev at 242 (cited in note
170) (expressing discomfort that an across-the-board warrant requirement for third-party
records would mean “a policeman might be able to holler at a person, forcibly spin him
around, press him to the hood of a car, and publicly feel up his entire body more easily than
he could get access to his Amazon records”; and advocating “[m]ore modest reforms” than an
across-the-board warrant requirement to avoid “adding a new set of paradoxes.”).
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reasoning to “rare” cases like this, perhaps these real-world implications stemming from a warrant requirement will encourage courts
to try harder.277 This hypothesized disincentive might not be pretty,
but it could be potent.
c. why not impose the low-level reasonableness standard
for document subpoenas?
The United States also argued, and this time three dissenting
Justices (most vociferously Justice Alito) agreed, that to be constitutionally reasonable a CSLI records request need satisfy only the
much-less-than-probable-cause standard applicable to a conventional subpoena duces tecum.278 For both CSLI and other compulsory
records requests, ofﬁcials demand that the request recipient produce
the speciﬁed documents, rather than themselves enter the recipient’s
space and rummage around until they ﬁnd and take the documents.
Justice Alito, after spending many pages arguing that “the Fourth
Amendment, as originally understood, did not apply to the compulsory production of documents at all,”279 conceded that in the late
nineteenth century the Court began to view compulsory process as a
type of “ﬁgurative” or “constructive” Fourth Amendment search.280
But the Court has long applied a different and lower standard of
reasonableness to constructive rather than full-blown rummage
searches: while the latter generally require a probable cause–backed

277
See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 769
(1994) (“Because it creates an unreasonable mandate for all searches, the warrant requirement
leads judges to artiﬁcially constrain the scope of the Amendment itself by narrowly deﬁning
‘search’ and ‘seizure.’ ”).
278
Carpenter US Brief at ∗44–50 (cited at note 126); Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2228–29
(Kennedy, J, dissenting); id at 2247–57 (Alito, J, dissenting).
279
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2250 (Alito, J, dissenting). According to Alito, a request to
produce is neither a textual “search” nor “seizure.” Id at 2251 (Alito, J, dissenting). And the
Founders opposed the Crown’s practice of general warrants because “[p]rivate area after
private area becomes exposed to the ofﬁcers’ eyes as they rummage through the owner’s
property in their hunt for the object or objects of the search.” Id (Alito, J, dissenting). A
request to produce raises no such privacy concerns, beyond revealing the secured object’s
contents. And no historical evidence supports the Fourth Amendment’s application to
compulsory process. Id at 2252 (Alito, J, dissenting). Justice Gorsuch appears more equivocal
on this latter point, noting there may be no good historical evidence either way in the form of
common law decisions. Id at 2271 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
280
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2254 (Alito, J, dissenting); see generally id at 2252–54 (tracing
history).
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search warrant, the former require only that a subpoena or similar
court order demanding documents “‘be sufﬁciently limited in scope,
relevant in purpose, and speciﬁc in directive so that compliance will
not be unreasonably burdensome.’”281 This lower standard, which I
will refer to as the “burdensome” test, reﬂects a “‘basic compromise’
between the ‘public interest’ in every man’s evidence and the private
interest ‘of men to be free from ofﬁcious meddling.’”282
This compromise is essential, Justice Alito maintained, to law
enforcement’s ability to investigate crime. As noted previously, various forms of compulsory process (including grand jury, legislative,
administrative subpoenas and similar law enforcement document
demands) are used regularly “to determine ‘whether there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed,’” which by deﬁnition
means that they are not supported by probable cause.283 After citing
numerous cases in which the Court across many decades has applied
the lower burdensome standard to document subpoenas issued to
third parties for their business records,284 Justice Alito concluded
that the same standard should govern here—especially because he
thought it quite odd for Carpenter to enjoy greater Fourth Amendment protection than Sprint does in Sprint’s own records.285
Not so odd at all, rejoined the Court. Almost all of Justice Alito’s
cited examples either “contemplated requests for evidence implicat-

281
Id at 2255 (Alito, J, dissenting), quoting Donovan v Lone Steer, Inc., 464 US 408, 415
(1984); see also Oklahoma Press, 327 US at 209 (holding that subpoena satisﬁes Fourth
Amendment reasonableness if “the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose
Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry,” and the “speciﬁcation of the documents to be produced [is] adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of
the relevant inquiry”). The lower standard also reﬂects the fact that the subpoena recipient
has an “opportunity to present objections” to a judicial ofﬁcer before producing the records,
which further minimizes the intrusion. Id at 195.
282
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2254 (Alito, J, dissenting), quoting Oklahoma Press, 327 US at 213.
Mild differences in the constitutional standards applied to different subpoena sources, see
Podgor, White Collar Crime § 17.4(A) at 570 (cited in note 275), are not important for present
purposes, and none of the opinions in Carpenter distinguished among them. See, for example,
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2234 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (referencing decision’s impact on “the
subpoena practices of federal and state grand juries, legislatures, and other investigative
bodies” as well as the “court-approved compulsory process in this case”).
283
284

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2256 (Alito, J, dissenting).

Id at 2254 (Alito, J, dissenting).
Id at 2256 (Alito, J, dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Alito’s assertion that the
Stored Communications Act order for Sprint’s records regarding Carpenter satisﬁed that
standard is hard to contest, given the Act’s required showing of relevance is more stringent,
and Sprint could produce the records without much effort. Id at 2255 (Alito, J, dissenting).
285
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ing diminished privacy interests” because the sought-after information had been publicly exposed, or requests for “a corporation’s own
books” containing information such as “corporate tax or payroll
ledgers.”286 The lone exception is Miller, where the Court had already
determined that Miller lacked a cognizable privacy interest in the
bank records.287 This observation’s relevance, presumably, is that the
Court had sometimes justiﬁed applying the lower burdensome
standard to traditional corporate records on the ground that legislatures have a special interest in regulating the corporations whose
formation they authorized, and such regulations could realistically
be enforced only through self-revelation of internal corporate operations—basically, creating a form of reduced expectations of privacy
in core corporate activities.288
Once again Chief Justice Roberts was a bit aggressive in characterizing precedent. Even assuming that corporations have diminished
privacy interests in their own tax, payroll, and similar business records, at least two of the cited decisions addressed types of records that
seem far aﬁeld and are awash with sensitivity concerns.289 Moreover,

286

Id at 2221–22 (majority).

287

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221–22.
See, for example, Oklahoma Press, 327 US at 204–5 (explaining that private corporations
are historically subject to “broad visitorial power” and “Congress may exercise wide investigative power over them, analogous to the visitorial power of the incorporating state”);
United States v Morton Salt, 338 US 632, 652 (1950) (“corporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of privacy”); LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 4.13(e) at 1085 (cited
in note 268).
288

289
Wayne R. LaFave et al, 3 Criminal Procedure § 8.7(a) at 34 n 38.550 (West, 4th ed,
2018–19 Pocket Part) (“LaFave 2018–19 Pocket Part § 8.7(a)”) (“However, not all of the cases
cited involved corporate records, not all involved business records, and not all involved business
regulations.”). The Court described United States v Powell, 379 US 48 (1964), as regarding
“corporate tax records,” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221 n 5, without acknowledging that the
demanded tax documents may include records pertaining to “a variety of non-business activities
(e.g., charitable contributions and medical expenses).” LaFave 2018–19 Pocket Part § 8.7(a) at 23
(cited earlier in this note). And the Court describes McPhaul v United States, 364 US 372 (1960),
as regarding “books and records of an organization,” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221 n 5, without
letting on that the House Un-American Activities Committee was seeking “all records, correspondence and memoranda” pertaining to the Civil Rights Congress’s structure, afﬁliation with
other organizations, and all monies received or expended by it to determine whether the Civil
Rights Congress was “being used for subversive purposes” and “afﬁliated with known Communist organizations.” McPhaul, 364 US at 381.
Importantly, even Miller does not clearly state that the customer, had he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his banks’ records, would have been entitled to insist on a warrant.
The court of appeals had held that Miller possessed a sufﬁcient Fourth Amendment interest to
challenge the subpoenas that produced those records, but the subpoenas were defective ( because
they were issued by the wrong entity and for a date when the grand jury was not in session), and
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Roberts ignored an entire body of lower-court cases applying the
burdensome standard to subpoenas seeking sensitive information
equally far aﬁeld from traditional corporate records.290 So claiming
that “this Court has never held that the Government may subpoena
third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy”291 means less than at ﬁrst appears.292
The Court’s stronger response is that the burdensome standard is
simply too weak to adequately protect the privacy interests at stake.
The “critical issue . . . [is] that CSLI is an entirely different species of
business record—something that implicates basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary government power much more di-

therefore Miller was not afforded “sufﬁcient ‘legal process.’ ” United States v Miller, 500 F2d 751,
758 (5th Cir 1974) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court reversed after ﬁnding Miller lacked
Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the subpoenas. But the Court did not clearly indicate
that if Miller retained a privacy interest affording him standing he could insist on a search
warrant rather than just properly issued subpoenas. See Miller, 425 US at 445 (holding that
Miller’s motion to suppress was correctly denied “since he possessed no Fourth Amendment
interest that could be vindicated by a challenge to the subpoenas”); id at 451 (Brennan, J, dissenting) (decrying government access to bank records “ ‘without any judicial control as to relevancy or other traditional requirements of legal process’ ”) (citation omitted); compare id at 456
(Marshall, J, dissenting) (asserting that statute mandating that banks maintain customers’ records
triggers “warrant and probable cause” requirement, and customers have standing to complain).
The Court also ignored another line of cases discussing other potential constitutional
limits on the subpoena power, in which the targets did not even raise Fourth Amendment
concerns notwithstanding the obviously sensitive nature of the requested documents. The
Carpenter Court’s claim that it had never previously upheld a third-party subpoena for
records in which ﬁrst parties retained a privacy interest is at least “inconsistent” with these
other cases. LaFave 2018–19 Pocket Part § 8.7(a) at 23–25 (cited earlier in this note). See,
for example, Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665 (1972) (rejecting First Amendment challenge
to subpoenas issued to newspaper reporters for interview notes); see also Fisher v United
States, 425 US 391, 401 n 7 (1976) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to business
records; ﬂagging “[s]pecial problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of
a personal diary,” but only because of an overbreadth concern for rummaging rather than
a privacy concern for the requested information), citing United States v Bennett, 409 F2d
888, 897 (2d Cir 1969).
290
Podgor, White Collar Crime § 16.10(D) at 534–35 (cited in note 275) (“A long line of
lower court rulings have upheld grand jury subpoenas demanding from individuals personal
records and correspondence, including emails stored on a computer.”); LaFave 2018–19
Pocket Part § 8.7(a) at 25 (cited in note 289) (noting that Court’s rule would also “require
rejection of a body of federal lower court precedent also not discussed in the Carpenter
opinions”); id at 35–36 nn 38.780–38.820 (citing and discussing cases).
291

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2221.
See also id at 2228–29 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“[I]t is well established that subpoenas
may be used to obtain a wide variety of records held by businesses, even when the records
contain private information.”).
292
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rectly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers.”293 Moreover, Justice
Alito’s position would prove too much, Roberts continued, because
then the warrant requirement would never protect any type of selfproducible record no matter the privacy interest retained in it.
Rather, “private letters, digital contents of a cell phone—any personal
information reduced to document form, in fact—may be collected by
subpoena” so long as the request isn’t too burdensome.294 Surely
that’s not right; and the Court noted that even Justice Kennedy
“declines to adopt the radical implications of this theory, leaving open
the question whether the warrant requirement applies when the
Government obtains the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s
own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ even when those papers or effects are held
by a third party.”295 Such an exception would sensibly “prevent the
subpoena doctrine from overcoming any reasonable expectation of
privacy.”296
Thus, the Court reached its purportedly humble conclusion: just as
these individual papers and effects receive full Fourth Amendment
protection, “[w]e simply think that such protection should extend as
well to a detailed log of a person’s movements over several years.”297
Government can continue using subpoenas in the “overwhelming
majority” of investigations, but a warrant is required “in the rare case”
where the suspect retains a legitimate privacy interest in third-party
records.
But here again, the Court may have bitten off more than it wants to
chew. While the Court afﬁrmed that a warrant would heretofore be
required for the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own
papers or effects in third-party hands, it is unclear why the Court’s
logic doesn’t equally apply to (1) such papers even when in the hands
of the ﬁrst rather than third party, and (2) other types of sensitive
documents as well. If so, the warrant-over-subpoena rule announced
here might have much broader application than the Court admitted.

293

Id at 2222 (majority).

294

Id.
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2222.

295
296

Id.

297

Id.
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d. did the court (inadvertently) modify subpoena doctrine
more generally?
A thought experiment: what if the government subpoenaed Carpenter directly, ordering him to turn over documents he personally
possessed that revealed his historical movements? Perhaps his cell
phone maintained such records within itself or in the cloud.298 Perhaps his job required him to keep detailed location records.299 Perhaps he exercised his federal statutory right under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and requested Sprint to send him a copy of
their records.300 Most intriguingly, perhaps the government earlier
ordered him by subpoena to obtain a copy of Sprint’s records precisely so that the government could then demand that he turn them
over.301
One might ﬁght the hypothetical, as government ofﬁcials would
usually prefer to get potentially incriminating records from third
rather than ﬁrst parties. If asked directly, the target might destroy
or alter the evidence, alert co-conspirators, etc. And he might also
refuse to comply, claiming that the act of producing the records
would itself violate his privilege against self-incrimination.302 But
these worries won’t always arise. Here, Carpenter would not likely
despoil the CSLI records knowing that Sprint has an accurate copy,
and perhaps the government does not mind him knowing he’s been
ﬁngered. And Carpenter may have no valid Fifth Amendment objection, either because his possession of the documents is a foregone
conclusion,303 or he has been granted immunity, or the records might
incriminate someone else but not him.

298
Chief Justice Roberts himself suggested this possibility in Riley, noting that “[h]istoric
location information is a standard feature on many smart phones . . . .” 134 S Ct at 2490. See
also Huq, Decision Is Being Hailed (cited in note 262) (“Locational data is held not only by
[the] telephone company. It is also contained on a person’s phone, even if she chooses to
disable locational tracking.”).
299
For example, perhaps he’s a cross-country truck driver who takes constant notes of time
and location to prove that he’s neither shirking nor exceeding maximum permissible driving
hours.
300

47 USC § 222.

301

See LaFave 2018–19 Pocket Part § 8.7(a) at 20–21, 30 nn 38.280–38.290 (cited in note 289)
(noting this possibility).
302
United States v Hubbell, 530 US 27, 36 (2000) (“[T]he act of producing documents in
response to a subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect.”).
303

Id at 44.
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The point is that the government could seek the same CSLI directly from Carpenter, and it would make no sense for the Court,
based on its own reasoning, to grant him less privacy protection for
the copy he possesses than for Sprint’s original. So the heightened
protection for CSLI necessarily applies to ﬁrst-party as well as thirdparty subpoenas.304 And indeed this conclusion ﬂows naturally from
the Court’s endorsement of Justice Kennedy’s caveat: if the warrant
requirement shields a target’s papers or effects “even when” they are
held by a third party,305 surely it also shields them when they remain
with the target herself. This in itself is a signiﬁcant statement: heretofore ﬁrst parties served document subpoenas were generally thought
protected by the same low-level burdensome standard as their thirdparty counterparts.306 Carpenter—perhaps inadvertently—suggests otherwise.
This, then, raises the question: how broadly applicable is this warrant requirement that supersedes ﬁrst-party subpoenas? Following
the Court’s language, it is at least expansive enough to include the
“modern-day equivalents” of papers and effects, and presumably the
original forms as well. This clearly addresses Justice Kennedy’s reference to letters and e-mails.307 But the Court also wanted to cover
Justice Alito’s broader reference to “private letters, digital contents
of a cell phone—any personal information reduced to document form, in
fact.”308 This sounds pretty broad.
Perhaps the adjectives “individual’s own” and “personal” suggest
the Court would stop short of saying that anything that’s technically a tetrad paper or effect now deserves warrant-level rather than
subpoena-level protection. Perhaps “personal” papers such as diaries
and letters are in, whereas “impersonal” papers such as drug ledgers
304
Otherwise, the Court’s holding has no bite. The government could always force targets
to get a copy of their “own” records from any and all third parties as a prelude to producing
them to the government in response to a subpoena duces tecum—and the foregone conclusion
doctrine would take the Fifth Amendment privilege out of the picture.
305

Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2222 (emphasis added).
See, for example, Kerr, Initial Reactions to Carpenter v. United States (USC Law Legal
Studies Paper No 18-14, July 6, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2SZV-TSKJ (“A
[ﬁrst-party] recipient does have Fourth Amendment rights at stake, but he can challenge the
subpoena only on the ground that it is overbroad or compliance is overly burdensome.”).
307
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2230 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
306

308
Id at 2222 (majority) (emphasis added). For his part, Justice Gorsuch would appear to
protect from warrantless subpoenas all records that are “sufﬁciently similar to letters in the
mail.” Id at 2271 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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and porn magazines are out. But it isn’t clear where this line comes
from, nor where one would draw it (intimate photos? appointment
books? the Kamasutra?). The Fourth Amendment text offers no help:
all papers and effects appear on the same footing, and indeed the whole
point of the Katz test is to identify and place other privacy interests on
the same footing as papers and effects, not on some higher plane. So
the Court again seems to invite a sensitivity test, whereby future
courts must decide if various documents or effects are sufﬁciently
“personal” to qualify for warrant rather than subpoena-level protection.309 A broad deﬁnition could signiﬁcantly ratchet up the showing
required to serve a large swath of ﬁrst-party document subpoenas.
Maybe the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination
renders this largely an academic discussion, as the act of production
doctrine typically presents a separate and high barrier for government to hurdle. But, as already noted, there may well be circumstances that naturally (or government can manufacture to) counter
the Fifth Amendment claim, and then the level of Fourth Amendment protection becomes signiﬁcant. This is another question for
judges to work through, with little guidance from the Court. And
even the Court’s assurance that CSLI presents the “rare case” applies
only to “records held by a third party”; it offers no guidance on how
rare it should be for ﬁrst-party document requests to require a warrant.
And now let us return to corporations and organizations, which
have no Fifth Amendment rights.310 Many entities generate and house
all sorts of documents containing sensitive information that seem far

309
Justice Thomas observes that the original meaning of “papers” might exclude business
records that don’t reveal “ ‘personal or speech-related conﬁdences.’ ” Id at 2241 n 8 (Thomas,
J, dissenting), quoting Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 Va L
Rev 869, 923–24 (1985). This statement leaves unclear whether that original meaning might
also exclude a similar category of nonbusiness records possessed by individuals. Either way,
Justice Thomas’s observation implies that any such insufﬁciently personal or speech-related
documents receive no Fourth Amendment protection at all, not that they are protected but
only as second-class citizens.
Of course there is nothing inherently odd about hinging the required justiﬁcation on the
nature or extent of privacy invasions. That happens with rummage searches, where it takes
more to search someone’s body cavities than pockets. But those privacy invasions are measured
by the nature of the search (body or pockets), not the nature of the information that will be
revealed (drugs or passwords). Police do not, for example, need greater suspicion to search a
house known to be stuffed with personal effects than a house known to be almost empty.
310
Wayne R. LaFave et al, 3 Criminal Procedure § 8.12(b) at 349 (West, 4th ed 2015)
(describing entity exception to self-incrimination privilege).
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aﬁeld from the kinds of “corporate tax and payroll ledgers” used to
rationalize the weaker protection for general business records. What
about subpoenas requesting state election precincts to produce voting
records during a voter fraud investigation; or subpoenas requesting
dioceses to produce priests’ personnel records during a sexual abuse
investigation?311 With perhaps some debate and handwringing, heretofore documents of these kinds have been considered subject to warrantless subpoena.312 But these are not standard business documents
of the sort traditionally deemed to have diminished privacy interests,
and indeed they might contain very sensitive and “personal” information about the organization, people within it, and even people outside of it.
So, in the end, the Court’s understandable desire not to let subpoena doctrine circumvent a CSLI warrant requirement seems to
land us here: the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends
to compulsory process served on third parties or ﬁrst parties ordering
them to produce either all traditional papers and effects, or at least
the “personal” subset thereof, as well as their modern-day equiva-

311
See Society of Jesus of New England v Commonwealth, 808 NE2d 272 (Mass 2004) (rejecting
motion to quash such a subpoena on free exercise of religion grounds; Fourth Amendment
challenge not even raised).
312
See, for example, Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DePaul L Rev 805,
844 (2005) (noting that Fourth Amendment provides “minimal protection against document
subpoenas, whether addressed to third parties or to the target of an investigation, and
whether aimed at organizational or personal records”).
Courts moved to protect personal privacy interests implicated by subpoenas issued to
corporations or their ofﬁcers generally do so, if at all, by ensuring the information is requested in
good faith or tightening the required showing of relevance—not by requiring a showing of
anything approaching probable cause. See, for example, In re McVane v FDIC, 44 F3d 1127, 1131
(2d Cir 1995) (requiring “more exacting scrutiny” of relevance where government seeks personal ﬁnancial records of family members of corporate director suspects); In re Administrative
Subpoena (Doe), 253 F3d 256, 270–71 (6th Cir 2001) (enforcing subpoena requesting personal
ﬁnancial documents of children of doctor suspected of health-care fraud where request was
“sufﬁciently narrowly-tailored to pass the reasonable relevance standard”). This approach
applies even where companies claim that compliance will chill exercise of their or others’ First
Amendment rights. See, for example, LaFave, 3 Criminal Procedure § 8.8(d) at 229–43 (cited in
note 310) (canvassing cases); id § 8.8(d) at 231 (“With few exceptions [generally involving ﬁshing
expeditions], such challenges have not succeeded in obtaining the quashing of the grand jury
directive”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Glassdoor, Inc.), 875 F3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir 2017) (applying a “good-faith” test and rejecting application of heightened “substantial connection” relevancy test to subpoena requesting identity and credit card/billing information for anonymous
on-line reviewers).
It is worth nothing that “[i]n white collar cases, subpoenas commonly require production of
such potentially private items as ‘reminder pads, notepads, diaries, calendars, day books, telephone directories, [and] telephone call logs.’ ” Podgor, White Collar Crime § 16.11(A) at 539
n 146 (citation omitted) (cited in note 275).
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lents. Perhaps this extension is troubling, as it might unsettle longstanding understandings and practices;313 and perhaps instead it is
welcome, as necessary to conform those practices to fully protect
Fourth Amendment interests.314 But it seems clear that the Court
was not well positioned in Carpenter to think this important issue
through. And at the very least, the ambiguity invites widespread but
good-faith resistance by those served with any and all subpoenas,
until the questions are sorted out.
Finally, what do we make of this observation by Justice Alito: if
the Fourth Amendment (and warrant requirement) “applies to the
compelled production of documents, then it must also apply to the
compelled production of testimony—an outcome that we have repeatedly rejected and which, if accepted, would send much of the ﬁeld
of criminal procedure into a tailspin”?315 That extension certainly
makes superﬁcial sense. Suppose the government subpoenas Carpenter’s co-defendant and half-brother Sanders to testify as to
Carpenter’s whereabouts over a week-long period.316 Assuming they
spent lots of time together, Sanders’s testimony might threaten
Carpenter’s reasonable privacy interests just as much as any sensitive
document might. In addition to revealing a great deal about Carpenter’s location and movements (along with what he did where
and with whom), Sanders might also have surreptitiously read Carpenter’s diary and snooped throughout his house, learning additional
sensitive information that Carpenter did not voluntarily share. Why
should the government need a probable cause–backed warrant to se-

313
Marty Lederman, Carpenter’s Curiosities (and Its Potential to Unsettle Longstanding Fourth
Amendment Doctrines) (Balkanization, June 26, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2NTR
-NXUB (Carpenter’s potential for “fundamental transformation of national subpoena practices (and other compulsory process practices) remains to be seen”).
314
See, for example, Slobogin, 54 DePaul L Rev at 845 (cited in note 312) (advocating that
Fourth Amendment should be “interpreted to demand that all ‘papers’ that contain personal
information—whether held by the subject or by a third-party institution—be afforded protection similar to that extended to the individual’s house, person, and effects”).
315
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2251 n 1 (Alito, J, dissenting), referencing United States v Dionisio,
410 US 1, 9 (1973) (“It is clear that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a ‘seizure’
in the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that summons may be inconvenient or burdensome.”).
316
Sanders could not refuse merely because testifying “might prove embarrassing or result
in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs.” United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 353
(1974). And the Fifth Amendment would offer Sanders no shield if the questions were
carefully designed not to elicit answers that could incriminate him, or if the government
immunized his testimony in advance.
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cure Carpenter’s CSLI records from Sprint, but not need to meet even
“the minimal requirement of ‘reasonableness’”317 to secure Sanders’s
testimony?
Advocates for overturning or cabining Miller-Smith primarily
justify treating documents and live testimony differently by invoking
a norm of counterparty autonomy. For Sanders, as a human being
with his own interests and motivations, autonomy over information
is central to “personhood.” This autonomy principle, they claim,
entitles Sanders to do what he wants with what he knows, and the
principle assertedly trumps Carpenter’s expectation of privacy. By
contrast, the argument runs, Sprint as an institution lacks the “personhood” underpinning an autonomy claim, so Sprint has no valued
reason to squeal that can trump Carpenter’s privacy interests.318
This proffered distinction raises more questions than I can address
here, such as what autonomy entails, who gets to claim it, and why it
ostensibly supersedes privacy values across the board. For now, I will
just highlight two concerns. First, why would we say that Sanders’s
autonomy interest in sharing his thoughts with the government (so
strong as to override Carpenter’s privacy concerns) is greater than his
autonomy interest in sharing documents that he possesses? And, even
more fundamentally, why would autonomy play a role here at all,
317

Dionisio, 410 US at 15.

318

See, for example, Slobogin, 75 Miss L J at 185–86 (cited in note 268):
The reason we should treat interviews differently from records requests is not because privacy is somehow irrelevant in the former situation, but because the target’s
interest in privacy is countered by an even stronger interest―the third party’s autonomy. Human information sources . . . should have a right to decide what to do
with the information they possess; in such cases, the subject’s privacy interest is
outweighed by the source’s autonomy interest. When the third party is an impersonal record-holder, on the other hand, concerns about denigrating “personhood”
through limitations on when information may be revealed are non-existent.

See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access to Third Party
Records 39 (3d ed 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/8CUC-3JUZ (asserting that “an individual [possessing information about a target] has an autonomy and free speech interest in
choosing to share information that will often trump any privacy interest” of that target; but
“the balance in cases involving institutional record-holders is different”). Compare Henderson,
34 Pepperdine L Rev at 1012 (cited in note 276) (questioning distinction between third-party
records and recollections and arguing that third-party doctrine should be modiﬁed to restrict
government access to both―which concededly “makes the adoption of a rational third-party
doctrine more far-reaching than one might have imagined”).
One might also suggest that, in general, live testimony is more fallible than documentary
evidence. But that is contingent on the nature of the evidence; maybe so for CSLI, and maybe
not for other kinds of documents. And, in any event, it is not the Fourth Amendment’s job to
regulate evidentiary quality. See note 222 and accompanying text.
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when by hypothesis Sanders does not want to either testify or produce
documents, and he is being forced to do so by threat of contempt? It
seems paradoxical to distinguish between Sanders and Sprint based
on Sanders’s autonomy when he is not legally permitted to exercise it.
And this distinction seems especially vulnerable in this case, because Sprint looks an awful lot like an (admittedly alert and everpresent) eyewitness being called to testify as to what it knows about
Carpenter’s whereabouts. As the Court recounts the transaction and
especially the involuntary nature of the information ﬂow, and given
that Carpenter himself does not (and cannot) know the information
that Sprint is actually recording,319 one can fairly describe the transaction as follows: Carpenter wants his cell phone to connect to Sprint’s
towers so the phone will function as contracted. Every now and then,
sometimes consciously (phone calls) and sometimes not (background
app refreshing), Carpenter essentially waves his hand and says “hey
Sprint, here I am, ﬁgure out your nearest cell tower so you can direct
some radio signals my way.” And Sprint says “Okay, and I’ll write
myself a note recording which tower we use, so I can keep track for
business purposes.” And now the government wants Sprint to share
that information, either by producing the written notes or by having
someone testify as to what they say. At some point, the distinction
between Sprint qua third-party record-holder and Sprint qua neighborwith-good-notes seems thin indeed.
Of course Justice Alito correctly implied that there is no way the
Court would ever lead law enforcement into a “tailspin” by requiring
warrants for subpoenas ad testiﬁcandum, and I am not suggesting that
Carpenter will inevitably slip down that slope. But absent a persuasive
answer to the question, the argument highlights the ever-growing
pile of seemingly fuzzy distinctions required to keep this decision’s
ripple effects “rare.”
IV. Conclusion
Justice Breyer was doubly correct in conceding at oral argument that “this is an open box. We know not where we go.”320 We
don’t know how modern surveillance methods and digital technology
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See note 26 and accompanying text.

Transcript of Oral Argument, Carpenter v United States, No 16-402, 35 (Nov 29, 2017),
archived at https://perma.cc/EYN8-3XYE.
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will progress; and we don’t know where Fourth Amendment doctrine will take us after Carpenter. It is certainly possible that this
decision will eventually be viewed “as being as important as Olmstead
and Katz in the overall arc of technological privacy”;321 the Court’s
initial embrace of the mosaic theory alone might qualify for such
recognition. But the scope of overall doctrinal and practical change
will turn on many factors and future decisions.
A majority of the Court is clearly motivated to tackle the challenges
that new technologies present to “ensure that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”322 And while
the Court’s holding is self-professedly narrow, much of its reasoning
is neither narrow nor clear. Many criminal defendants and privacy
advocates are already lining up to press further expansions of Katz
as a bulwark against digital and other technological threats to privacy.
But lurking in the background of this decision―and the forefront
of law enforcement minds around the country―is a concern that
reasonable and early government access to at least short-term CSLI
and certain types of third-party (and perhaps ﬁrst-party) records is
crucial for investigating, prosecuting, and perhaps even forestalling
crime. Privacy is a paramount societal value; security is too. And if
the Court consistently applies a warrant requirement wherever thirdparty records implicate ﬁrst-party Fourth Amendment interests, then
any accommodation for law enforcement needs will necessarily come
through the continuing life, in some form or another, of the MillerSmith framework. For this reason, in my view, excited reports that “the
third-party doctrine is almost dead”323 are greatly exaggerated. The
Court has surely unsettled the old balance to combat new digital
threats. It will take time for the Court to construct a new one.
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Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter (cited in note 209).
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Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2223, quoting Olmstead, 277 US at 473–74.
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